Amtrak 91 - CSX Collision Cayce, SC - 2/4/18

Is the spur with the parked freight new? Its ballast looks different from the other trackage, including that to the car-unloader facility. (The facility looks new but its spur does not...)

BlendedBreak wrote:There is a 99% chance that the Amtrak crew was at fault here. Pointing a finger at CSX is unwise.

FROM CSX RULE BOOK
302 - Locations That Must Be Approached Prepared to Stop
302.1 Unless the location is equipped with signals, trains must approach the end of two or more main tracks, junctions, drawbridges, and railroad crossings at grade prepared to stop until it has been visually determined that:
1. Switches, if equipped, are properly lined, and
2. Track is clear.

The key words there are "main tracks". You don't have to be prepared to stop at industry switches, for example. If the siding (or any of the side tracks) are not defined as a "main track" or the switch isn't defined as a "junction" then this rule is not applicable to the switch in question.

Still too early to absolve the deceased Amtrak crew of any fault. Unfortunately in situations like this there are frequently multiple points of failure and no one "smoking gun".

Maybe BlendedBreak was alluding to this:

"Amtrak President and Chief Executive Richard Anderson said CSX was responsible for the tracks and signals, including one that had a lock attached to it and diverted the Amtrak train onto the side track.

"CSX had lined and padlocked the switch off the mainline to the siding, causing the collision," he said in a statement."

http://news.trust.org/item/20180204122114-wgkuu" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Trinnau wrote:

BlendedBreak wrote:There is a 99% chance that the Amtrak crew was at fault here. Pointing a finger at CSX is unwise.

FROM CSX RULE BOOK
302 - Locations That Must Be Approached Prepared to Stop
302.1 Unless the location is equipped with signals, trains must approach the end of two or more main tracks, junctions, drawbridges, and railroad crossings at grade prepared to stop until it has been visually determined that:
1. Switches, if equipped, are properly lined, and
2. Track is clear.

The key words there are "main tracks". You don't have to be prepared to stop at industry switches, for example. If the siding (or any of the side tracks) are not defined as a "main track" or the switch isn't defined as a "junction" then this rule is not applicable to the switch in question.

Still too early to absolve the deceased Amtrak crew of any fault. Unfortunately in situations like this there are frequently multiple points of failure and no one "smoking gun".

Thanks for this explanation, Trinnau. In my opinion it's very disrespectful to say there is a high chance one party or another is at fault less than 24 hours after the incident since it resulted in two members of the Amtrak crew being killed.

Trinnau wrote:

BlendedBreak wrote:There is a 99% chance that the Amtrak crew was at fault here. Pointing a finger at CSX is unwise.

FROM CSX RULE BOOK
302 - Locations That Must Be Approached Prepared to Stop
302.1 Unless the location is equipped with signals, trains must approach the end of two or more main tracks, junctions, drawbridges, and railroad crossings at grade prepared to stop until it has been visually determined that:
1. Switches, if equipped, are properly lined, and
2. Track is clear.

The key words there are "main tracks". You don't have to be prepared to stop at industry switches, for example. If the siding (or any of the side tracks) are not defined as a "main track" or the switch isn't defined as a "junction" then this rule is not applicable to the switch in question.

Still too early to absolve the deceased Amtrak crew of any fault. Unfortunately in situations like this there are frequently multiple points of failure and no one "smoking gun".

Tracks change at the foul-point. There is a whole rule book that discusses approaching points prepared to stop.

BlendedBreak wrote:Tracks change at the foul-point. There is a whole rule book that discusses approaching points prepared to stop.

That still doesn't discount what I've said. Unless TWO main tracks come together, it's not applicable. I'm just reading the rule you've presented. If there is more on it, please educate us. Where I'm from it's not required and you would never get a train over the road if they had to stop at every switch that could potentially be misaligned. The rules are in place to prevent this, and we rely on our professional colleagues day in and day out to make sure we get home safe. Unfortunately, two more will not because something or some combination of things weren't done right. And this is exactly the reason why Congress mandated PTC. The technology can save lives when people make a mistake.

It was very tacky for Anderson to jump the gun. You never know what the NTSB may uncover that comes back on you.

It tells me more that Dupont/Crozet/Cayce in such rapid succession has the place totally fatigued. and that any scapegoat must be seized upon immediately.

"There is a 99% chance that the Amtrak crew was at fault here. Pointing a finger at CSX is unwise."

With all due respect, there is a 100% chance that not all of the information collected so far is correct.

Lets just wait until all the info is collected before anyone starts assigning blame. A passenger train diverted to a track it was not intended to be on because a turnout was not aligned and locked to the expected (main track) position. Why that turnout was in that position is the crux of the investigation right now.

Yes, perhaps the Amtrak crew missed a "diverging signal" and did not slow down before the turnout, but why pray tell were they intentionally diverted to a track that was occupied by a "parked" freight train ????

If the Amtrak train was intentionally diverted to the siding they should have seen a Stop signal because the track in front of them was occupied. If the track (siding with CSX train parked and stationary) was the intended route for the 91 why was an empty uncrewed CSX train parked there ???

Good railroaders died, folks were hurt, lets take the time to study and understand what went wrong, obliviously something went wrong.

Roscoe P. Coaltrain wrote:It was very tacky for Anderson to jump the gun. You never know what the NTSB may uncover that comes back on you.

It tells me more that Dupont/Crozet/Cayce in such rapid succession has the place totally fatigued. and that any scapegoat must be seized upon immediately.

He is probably banking on the whole story having lost the media's attention by the time the NTSB releases a report.

This sounds a lot like that other South Carolina accident about 10 years ago, where a mainline freight went into a siding left open, rupturing some chemical tanks in the siding and leading to the death of about 10 people. Also CSX IIRC. (I apologize if this was noted already earlier in the thread and I missed it. )

Did the switch in question in this incident control any signals to alert soutbound trains , but the signals were turned off due to the maintenance noted earlier? - ie. at least 2 things went wrong - switch left open and signals turned off (and whatever signal outage safety plan not followed).

EDIT: Correction, the 2005 wreck was NS, not CSX. But there was yet another similar wreck in SC in 2015 on CSX - another switch to a siding lined the wrong way, a mainline freight again running into a train on the siding and causing a chemical spill, but with no fatalities that time. Don't know if the tracks were signalled in those 2 instances and if any rules were broken besides the switches left misaligned.

BOth are described there: http://www.thestate.com/news/local/arti ... 60629.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

If I were AMTK Mechanical, I’d be taking a hard look at Amfleet bodies starting tomorrow morning, especially A-II food service cars. Nothing should snap in the center like that, even given the geometry involved.

The signal system was suspended due to maintenance, no signals were in play to protect anything! This is not an uncommon thing to see, and there are rules in place to protect against these types of accidents.

This was normally Single track ABS/261,From an ETT dating back to 2008(CSX Florence Division,Columbia Sub) Mp S 366.9 "Silica" siding,just south
of a "control point" named "SE Dixiana" at MP s 366.5,the Auto ramp tracks are across the Main line at the same MP(S 366.9)
Believe that is an electric locked switch,with the signals offline,there was no way the Amtrak crew knew that the switch was reversed instead
of normal.
CSX split away from NORAC Rules,unknown if they use DTC rules when the Signals are offline.
Possible last set of working signals Amtrak saw was the NS controlled switches at MP S361.2 "Devine Jct".




(Mr Norman,Thank you)

Here is a link to the CSX operating rules book for those that care to dive in, please note that this is a 2014 edition.

http://0924.utu.org/Files/%5B3100%5D201 ... 20Book.pdf" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Which Amfleet II lounge was involved? This is the first loss in the fleet of 25 Amfleet II diner/lounges in more than 35 years since delivered in 1981-83. All 25 were rebuilt in the diner lite program between 2006 and 2010.