Amtrak 91 - CSX Collision Cayce, SC - 2/4/18

abaduck wrote:Brit here.

On a US legal point of order, I remember reading in comments on the recent crash near Seattle that Amtrak has a shield law, artificially capping their total liability for ordinary damages for death and injury in any one incident at a certain figure.

Does that law apply only to Amtrak? IF another party - say CSX - was legally liable in a particular incident, they would have no cap on their liability to injured parties and damages would be unlimited?

I wonder if the constitutionality of that law has ever been tested...

Thanks.

It does not apply to freight carriers like CSX. Now if this accident turns out to be CSX's fault, one would expect lawsuits to be filed against them.

In late 2015, the Amtrak accident liability cap was raised from $200 Million to $295 Million.
http://thehill.com/policy/transportatio ... k-lawsuits" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Robert Sumwalt (NTSB Chairman) noted at the 4pm press briefing that the switch which Amtrak 91 took was still lined and locked (the padlock was still on it) to route traffic into the siding. https://www.grasswire.com/2018/02/04/tw ... ns-collide" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

The CSX train had unloaded cars at the autorack facility just to the southwest of the collision location and was backed into the siding before 91 passed through. They've recovered the Amtrak front-facing video camera, but neither EDR from either Amtrak or CSX due to the condition of the two locomotives (yet).

Can't speak to current CSX procedures. In the pre-EHH days before I retired, the announcement of Signal Suspensions were issued on Superintendents Bulletins which each employee operating on the affected subdivision must have in their possession to operate on the territory. These Bulletin instructions would be issued several days in advance of the Suspension becoming effective. On the Division I worked, a 'command center' was established with a designated telephone number that all crews were REQUIRED to contact, that center was staffed with either a Official or a designated employee with the requirement of briefing all crews on their requirements to operate through the suspension area. Which switches they may have to hand operate and/or which switches a Switch-tender may operate or which switches the Dispatcher would operate. On my Division in the pre-EHH era Signal Suspensions were taken very seriously as a method of operation was being temporarily put in place that none of the employees involved are familiar with, not the train and engine crew and not the Train Dispatcher.

My Division was not the one involved in this incident.

Switch wrong position. Amtrak 91 Silver Star CSX collision 4 Feb 2018

Here's the first NTSB presser (video):
https://youtu.be/sA6f4cW7bYg" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Now with additional views it does seem clear that the Cafe car did buckle and snap. Good thing it was not a coach and was mostly empty at 2:30 am.

Seems if the head end hit the emergency brake a few seconds after they saw the misaligned turnout that the brakes on the front of the train may have been more fully applied and the viewliners on the rear may not have had much brake application yet.

The cafe car was caught in the middle...

What a sad preventable tragedy...

SouthernRailway wrote:

8th Notch wrote:

SouthernRailway wrote:Are the Viewliners repairable?

Not trying to beat up on Amtrak, but after Metro-North had a few incidents, there was a big push to improve its safety practices. Time for the same for Amtrak?

How can you blame Amtrak here when we don’t know the cause?

It just seems like one thing after another. Amtrak may have zero fault for this one or for the wreck in Virginia, but the Cascades wreck?

What happened to Operation Lifesaver? Freight RRs run it, but maybe Amtrak could encourage Operation Lifesaver trains to tour the US?

Operation Lifesaver has nothing to do with this instance, Operation Lifesaver is for railroad highway grade crossing accidents and trespasser strikes.

Each railroad accident has its own path to happening - you can not link the last 3 Amtrak incidents together.

8th Notch wrote:
Operation Lifesaver has nothing to do with this instance, Operation Lifesaver is for railroad highway grade crossing accidents and trespasser strikes.

The wreck in Virginia perhaps could have been avoided by Operation Lifesaver.

Does anybody know what CSX subdivision that was involved in this wreck?
If the signals were down so would the PTC(If any) at the same time?
UNreal.

This could be a problem for the Amfleets, if the cafe car snapping is found to be due (or exacerbated) to a structural defect or fatigue.

"Sumwalt said at a news conference Sunday afternoon that the switch was padlocked to send trains on the main line to the side track, which conductors are supposed to do when they change lines."

https://www.yahoo.com/news/latest-2-kil ... 06605.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Clearly someone didn't consider another train would be coming down the track. The prelim investigation could get wrapped up quickly, but it's not going to be fun for anyone involved.

RICHARD anderson should shut his mouth immediately.

Dick and WIck the railroad superstars are going to be in for a rude awakening.

BlendedBreak wrote:RICHARD anderson should shut his mouth immediately.

Dick and WIck the railroad superstars are going to be in for a rude awakening.

What exactly do you mean by this?

Backshophoss wrote:Does anybody know what CSX subdivision that was involved in this wreck?

Columbia Sub, Mr. Backshop

daybeers wrote:

BlendedBreak wrote:RICHARD anderson should shut his mouth immediately.

Dick and WIck the railroad superstars are going to be in for a rude awakening.

What exactly do you mean by this?

There is a 99% chance that the Amtrak crew was at fault here. Pointing a finger at CSX is unwise.

FROM CSX RULE BOOK
302 - Locations That Must Be Approached Prepared to Stop
302.1 Unless the location is equipped with signals, trains must approach the end of two or more main tracks, junctions, drawbridges, and railroad crossings at grade prepared to stop until it has been visually determined that:
1. Switches, if equipped, are properly lined, and
2. Track is clear.