Metrolink Crash in Chatsworth, CA - 9/12/08

"Silverliner II"Ironically enough, one of the results of the Bergen Junction wreck was the hastening of NJT to install cab signals/ATC on the entire Hoboken division and on the parts of the Newark Division that were not already so equipped.

As for other railroads, most don't bother with cab signals/ATc simply because of the cost. Even after accidents like this. Although if the time factors are accurate, even cab signals and ATC may not have prevented the Metrolink accident, since the Metrolink train would have come to a stop when his cabs dropped, and the UP freight would still be trying to stop after his cab signals dropped upon intrusion of the Metrolink...

You obviously know nothing of how ATC works. Had the track been under the control of ATC the train would have never been allowed to pass the red signal. The most restrictive signal would have been in the last track circuit before the line side signal that protects the turnout. The most restrictive ATC signal is no signal being transmitted through the track circuit.

NJTMatt wrote:Man, I knew something like this would be said.... In NO way is it the teen railfan's fault. As an engineer if I choose to do something to distract me from my duties, its on me.

I agree. But what does that say about these railfans who thought it was appropriate to text the engineer while he was operating a train? I mean, if they supposedly love trains so much, wouldn't they realize that was a big no-no? These kids really expect to be engineers someday?

Railfans often pride themselves on the fact that since they have more experience around trains they can somehow notice unusual sights or sounds and alert the railroad. I don't fully understand that, but here's an instance where railfans were definitely doing the wrong thing, even if the texting didn't result in the crash directly.

You can indeed pass a stop signal in ATC/CSS territory. Lets clear this up. Cab signals have conformity to wayside signals. For example a clear is a clear, and approach med in the cab conforms to a advance approach, app med, app Limited, Limited clear, or medium clear. The wayside signal govern over the cabs in a more restrictive case The cab signal displays the indication and the ATC makes the engineer slow down or get it with a penalty brake application/ full service. In the case of a stop signal, the conformity of the cab signal will be a restricting, were the ATC will allow you to proceed at 20mph. The only systems set up to prevent a train from going through a stop signal to my knowledge is on NJT In SES territory, and on Amtrak were they have ACSES. That to my knowledge is not a circuit in the rail like CSS, but rather transponder boxes to slow you down and stop you using the Cabs signals/ ATC in the engines and the ATS system, Automatic Train Stop.

Sand Box John wrote:You obviously know nothing of how ATC works. Had the track been under the control of ATC the train would have never been allowed to pass the red signal. The most restrictive signal would have been in the last track circuit before the line side signal that protects the turnout. The most restrictive ATC signal is no signal being transmitted through the track circuit.

Umm, no, that's not correct.

An ATC installation still would not have stopped the train - ATC does not enforce a positive stop, it enforces prompt brake application. As long as the engineer's brake application is within the time and deceleration profile demanded by the onboard cab signal package for the given speed command (in this case, he would have gotten Restricting, with no code in the circuit), he can keep going, right through a Stop signal if he chooses, or becomes distracted. ATC doesn't have the ability to truly stop a train (there is no Stop cab signal - most restrictive is Restricting), which is why the Feds have been talking about mandating PTC for several years now.

Plus, the previous poster is correct about the freight - he would have seen his cabs drop from Approach Diverging (or Approach Medium - not sure if they use speed or route signaling on that territory) to Restricting when the Metrolink train entered the block with him. ATC would have helped, since it would have forced the Metrolink engineer to apply his brakes (to slow to restricted speed) in order to comply with the cab drop in advance of the Stop signal, and the UP engineer would have applied brakes as well when his cabs dropped. But, the original poster may have a point about the time involved; of course, this is just speculation as there are no cab signals/ATC on that territory.

He is a 15 year old kid. The engineer is a 40 year old TRAINED railroad employee who is responsible for the lives of thousands. I expect the grown up in this situation to have better judgement. This is why we don't have 15 year old boys running trains. There is a level of maturity on must have to have that much responsibility. I know that when I was 15 and an engineer asked me up in to the cab to take a ride, I did not think about weather I was a distraction or not! Never crossed my mind. You really don't know that until you work for the railroad. I feel very bad for this kid because deep down he will have to deal with this as well, plus he lost a dear friend. He is now just learning some of the realities of life on the railroad, and how bad things can even happen to the best of railroaders. Its the nature of the job. I hope it does not turn him away from the rails. What has happened is nothing less than tragic.

Steve F45 wrote:
I watched that video about the teens and the texting and wondered if they could be held accountable in any way?

No, as there was no intent, nor could it be inferrred that they knew that what they were doing posed a high liklihood of danger due to their ages and inexperience. If this is true, it is indeed 100 % the fault of the engineer. Also civil-wise, if all this evidence is factual, there will be no defense (or excuse) regarding multiple huge civil lawsuits. (In spite of all the harm done, I actually feel sorry for those kids on the phone. That's going to be a heavy load to carry for a lifetime.)

The most important thing at this point is to remember the deceased and injured in our prayers. None of us were operating the trains nor do we have access to the event recorders and related investigation material. Anything at this point is purely speculative in nature, and we should withhold all judgment against this engineer and his friend until the investigation is concluded.

3rdrail wrote: No, as there was no intent, nor could it be inferrred that they knew that what they were doing posed a high liklihood of danger due to their ages and inexperience.

Any capable attorney would get them on the stand ask to be walked through the friendship or relationship these youths had with the engineer. And, give those kids a chance to tell how much they (think they) know about trains and they would run their mouths putting out more than enough evidence to conclude they may have known better than to distract the engineer.

Now while it is not likely the youths would be found directly liable, I'm confident they could be identified as contributing elements in the overall responsibility, as well they should be. Face it, whether we like it or not, someone is going to have to pay. And as far as the kids having to shoulder the load, well why not? Because for every time they were out there doing this crap, they had the opportunity to either take a chance and dodge the bullet, or to do the right thing. Now that the consequences have caught up to them, life doesn't need allow them to run and hide their heads when it doesn't pan out. Twenty-five dead... 135 injured...

braves2905 wrote:Anything at this point is purely speculative in nature, and we should withhold all judgment against this engineer and his friend until the investigation is concluded.

What's the point of a message board then? Half the fun is speculating and playing armchair conductor, engineer, or whatever.

KarlJ wrote: Any capable attorney would get them on the stand ask to be walked through the friendship or relationship these youths had with the engineer. And, give those kids a chance to tell how much they (think they) know about trains and they would run their mouths putting out more than enough evidence to conclude they may have known better than to distract the engineer.

I think that in the court of public opinion they do hold some element of responsibility. We can sit here all day and condemn their actions. I sure am. From the perspective of a train enthusiast they shouldn't have been sending text messages to an engineer on duty just so they could find out when the damn Coast Starlight was going to pass. In fact they shouldn't be bothering on-duty railroad workers AT ALL.

However, legally, nothing is going to happen to these kids. Besides, they don't have money anyway, so there's no point in going after them.

In regards to comments about the Metrolink locomotive telescoping into the first passenger car, I think that the dynamics of the crash might be that the mass of the Union Pacific freight train (which is most likely much greater than the Metrolink train) would have caused the Metrolink engine to rebound into the passenger car. I'm not a safety expert, but I did work as a technician with mechanical engineers at a crash test company that contracted to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. We performed NCAP tests on cars plus crash tests on school buses.

I just hope this doesn't discourage the continued expansion of commuter rail in California. I think that trains are much more energy efficient and safe than cars. I've traveled on ICE in Germany and the bullet trains in Japan (California needs them). I rode Metrolink from Covina for 6 years when I worked in downtown LA. It certainly beats sitting in gridlock on the freeways (you heard that from a former Porsche mechanic).

My heart goes out to the families of those killed and to all of the injured.

jb9152 wrote:

Sand Box John wrote:You obviously know nothing of how ATC works. Had the track been under the control of ATC the train would have never been allowed to pass the red signal. The most restrictive signal would have been in the last track circuit before the line side signal that protects the turnout. The most restrictive ATC signal is no signal being transmitted through the track circuit.

Umm, no, that's not correct.

An ATC installation still would not have stopped the train - ATC does not enforce a positive stop, it enforces prompt brake application. As long as the engineer's brake application is within the time and deceleration profile demanded by the onboard cab signal package for the given speed command (in this case, he would have gotten Restricting, with no code in the circuit), he can keep going, right through a Stop signal if he chooses, or becomes distracted. ATC doesn't have the ability to truly stop a train (there is no Stop cab signal - most restrictive is Restricting), which is why the Feds have been talking about mandating PTC for several years now.

Plus, the previous poster is correct about the freight - he would have seen his cabs drop from Approach Diverging (or Approach Medium - not sure if they use speed or route signaling on that territory) to Restricting when the Metrolink train entered the block with him. ATC would have helped, since it would have forced the Metrolink engineer to apply his brakes (to slow to restricted speed) in order to comply with the cab drop in advance of the Stop signal, and the UP engineer would have applied brakes as well when his cabs dropped. But, the original poster may have a point about the time involved; of course, this is just speculation as there are no cab signals/ATC on that territory.

European ATS/ATC systems work the way Sand Box John described, with regard to passing a red signal. The split second the front of the train passes the red signal, full emergency braking is applied.

There is a more basic question here that involves dispatching policy. My understanding is that at one time, all freight trains were supposed to be fully contained in a siding with the switches closed a certain number of minutes before the scheduled arrival at the siding of a passenger train. No "running meets" of freight trains with passenger trains should be allowed.

If this critical principle had been observed, the eastbound freight would have been held by the dispatcher at the next siding to the west, which according to posters who are familiar with the line would be at some point three tunnels west of the impact site.

Given that the passenger carrier dispatches this railroad so that it can control on-time performance of its own trains, Metrolink had the ability to put the freight train into that more westerly siding. Its failure to serve its own need for OTP as well as its need for safety makes the violation of the principle even more inexplicable.

Comments?

delvyrails wrote:There is a more basic question here that involves dispatching policy. My understanding is that at one time, all freight trains were supposed to be fully contained in a siding with the switches closed a certain number of minutes before the scheduled arrival at the siding of a passenger train.

I've never heard that as an operating rule. It might (and probably was) policy at some railroads but that would have been for maintaining good public perception of the on-time performance of the passenger trains.

As an operating rule, I suspect you're thinking of the rule under timetable and train order operations that an inferior train had to be clear at least usually five minutes before the scheduled arriving time of an opposing superior train. A train could be superior by class (e.g. first (usually passenger), second, third, down to extras which had no class and were at the bottom), direction (generally eastbounds were superior to westbounds of the same class), and timetable special instruction. The dispatcher could modify superiority and fix meeting points with train orders. There was no reason under that system that a freight couldn't be superior to a passenger (e.g. "Engine 1234 operate extra A to B with right over all other trains" in its simplest form).

Spokker wrote: I think that in the court of public opinion they do hold some element of responsibility. We can sit here all day and condemn their actions. I sure am. From the perspective of a train enthusiast they shouldn't have been sending text messages to an engineer on duty just so they could find out when the damn Coast Starlight was going to pass. In fact they shouldn't be bothering on-duty railroad workers AT ALL.

I don't see how they can be held responsible in any way. The engineer has full control of his texting activity. If it would distract him from his duties than he can ignore the text message until it is safe to do so. If the ringtone would be a distraction he can turn it off. By that reasoning if you were driving your car and hit another car after receiving a text message then the person who texted you can be held partially responsible. Of course as of now we have no idea if the texting had any affect on the accident or not.

Terry

"NJTMatt", quote="jb9152"

It appears to me that your explanations of ATC is not a true ATC system but is a passive version of ATP. In the signal maintainer manuals that I have that were written for rapid transit ATC applacation, no speed commands / cab signals means stop. ATP in the same manuals allows the train engineer / operator to proceed with no speed commands / cab signals at restricted speed being prepared to stop at the next signal or obstruction.

In this particular case the signal was an interlocking signal. In my signal maintainer manuals interlocking signals are stop and stay signals.