Metrolink Crash in Chatsworth, CA - 9/12/08

This makes the 1996 wreck at west end on NJ Transit look like childs play. I'm not familiar with how Metro-Link is set up but I would assume that there are no cab signals on this line. I can only imagine the look on the dispatchers face when the alarm went off at his desk.

farmerjohn wrote:Well to blame the engineer, I am surprised dispatch did not see this? or the conductor did not say anything?

Conductor may not have been on the head end. But then again, I'm sure GCOR rules are similar to NORAC where the engineer would have to report any approach or stop signals back via radio in Non-CSS territory.

When the stop signal violation alarm went off at the dispatch office, I'm sure plenty of people saw what was about to happen. Dead spot in radio contact? Who knows...

there may well be massive problems at Metro link, but I am impressed that they have with-in 24 hours admitted that their employee was to blame. Contrast that with Amtrak in the Chicago crash, where the exact same thing happens but the company stone walls.

I'll just add my two cents that I too am appalled at the amount of "telescoping", which as was said before, reminds me of one of the frequent mid-west interurban accidents circa early 20th Century. Weren't anti-climbers developed to prevent this sort of thing from happening ? Of course the locomotive has more mass and weight than did the coach, by my God ! Have the installation of "crush zones" gone too far to the point where we are back in 1910 ?

Does anyone know what the speeds were of both trains? Did the metrolink take the siding and just keep going or was he on the main the whole time?

edit: i was going thru all the pics on yahoo and one of them looks like the engineer covered in a cloth cover. Its pics like this that I wish they didn't have to publish for viewing. It's just disturbing to see.

3rdrail wrote:I'll just add my two cents that I too am appalled at the amount of "telescoping", which as was said before, reminds me of one of the frequent mid-west interurban accidents circa early 20th Century. Weren't anti-climbers developed to prevent this sort of thing happening ? Of course the locomotive has more mass and weight than did the coach, by my God ! Have the installation of "crush zones" gone too far to the point where we are back in 1910 ?

the locomotive is supposed to ABSORB the energy so the the passenger filled cars behind do not, this seems not to have happened. I am a well known FRA critic, I think their theory on crash protection is asinine, perhaps America is ready for a debate on the subject.

farmerjohn wrote:Well to blame the engineer, I am surprised dispatch did not see this? or the conductor did not say anything?

Assuming that this was indeed a Stop signal violation by the Metrolink engineer, even if the dispatcher did see it, and even if there was an overrun alarm in the control office, the best that he/she could have done was to call out a warning over the radio (which may have happened - we'll find out as the investigation progresses). Dispatchers cannot stop a train, only an engineer's hand on the brake or some kind of positive stop enforcement system/ATC can.

icgsteve wrote:there may well be massive problems at Metro link, but I am impressed that they have with-in 24 hours admitted that their employee was to blame. Contrast that with Amtrak in the Chicago crash, where the exact same thing happens but the company stone walls.

It wasn't "exactly the same thing". The Amtrak engineer was confused by multiple meanings to the last signal aspect he passed depending upon the rule book/territory. If this is actually a Stop signal violation, then it's entirely different. A Stop signal is pretty much a Stop signal, not much ambiguity. I'm not sure whether or not the Metrolink/Veolia engineers have to operate over territories that have 'conflicting' signal aspects, but in the case of a Stop signal, I don't think there's much variety, no matter where you're running.

I'm actually not that impressed with Metrolink's admission, actually. I think it's a little premature, but I'm certainly not second-guessing them.

sullivan1985 wrote:

farmerjohn wrote:Well to blame the engineer, I am surprised dispatch did not see this? or the conductor did not say anything?

Conductor may not have been on the head end. But then again, I'm sure GCOR rules are similar to NORAC where the engineer would have to report any approach or stop signals back via radio in Non-CSS territory.

When the stop signal violation alarm went off at the dispatch office, I'm sure plenty of people saw what was about to happen. Dead spot in radio contact? Who knows...

I'll be the first to admit it has been a long time since I've worked for a railroad and I'm sure CTC technology has changed (assuming this is CTC - as I said it's been a long time but the last official knowledge I have of the signal and rules for that line has it as track warrant territory - but that was 25+ years ago) but how do you know there is a "stop signal violation alarm". What I knew for CTC couldn't distinguish between which leg of a switch "block" was entered. The Metrolink train entering from the two-track (or main and siding) side of the switch would look identical to the freight entering from the single-track side. Now maybe it can tell there but a lot of people seem to go assuming the existence of technology that might not actually be there.

But again, you're not considering the timing. From what I can tell, it was 1/4 mile from the fouling point to the crash scene - at most 30 seconds. Heck, 1980's CTC technology couldn't even have sent the block occupancy code to the master CTC panel in 30 seconds. But even supposing the dispatcher received an alarm instantaneously, he needed to look and digest the information, grab the microphone, bring up the proper transmitter (maybe), and talk - by which point both trains probably saw each other and were already in emergency.

lstone19 wrote:I'll be the first to admit it has been a long time since I've worked for a railroad and I'm sure CTC technology has changed (assuming this is CTC - as I said it's been a long time but the last official knowledge I have of the signal and rules for that line has it as track warrant territory - but that was 25+ years ago) but how do you know there is a "stop signal violation alarm". What I knew for CTC couldn't distinguish between which leg of a switch "block" was entered. The Metrolink train entering from the two-track (or main and siding) side of the switch would look identical to the freight entering from the single-track side. Now maybe it can tell there but a lot of people seem to go assuming the existence of technology that might not actually be there.

But again, you're not considering the timing. From what I can tell, it was 1/4 mile from the fouling point to the crash scene - at most 30 seconds. Heck, 1980's CTC technology couldn't even have sent the block occupancy code to the master CTC panel in 30 seconds. But even supposing the dispatcher received an alarm instantaneously, he needed to look and digest the information, grab the microphone, bring up the proper transmitter (maybe), and talk - by which point both trains probably saw each other and were already in emergency.

Many modern CTC systems can see (with some success, but also some false alarms) successive circuit occupancies to be able to interpret direction of movement, and therefore into an occupied block. It wouldn't surprise me that an overrun alarm, triggered by the successive occupancy of the circuit in advance and the interlocking circuit (flagged as "Stop"), sounded in the control office. But your analysis of the time involved seems very reasonable to me. Even if the dispatcher did get an alarm, he or she would have had little time to call out a warning.

This accident is eerily similar to the 1996 Amtrak Cap. Ltd./MARC accident in Silver Spring, MD on the CSX Metropolitan Sub. That engineer also coasted past a red signal, plowing into the nbound Amtrak train that was switching tracks at Georgetown Jct., killing himself and 10 other people. The MARC cab car looked a bit like that Bombardier except it was more sideswiped, rather than head-on. Ever since then MARC has been obsessed with safety as is regarded as one of the safest systems in the country. This CA Metrolink incident is definitely the worst passenger rail accident (in this country) since then. At the very least this incident will also help prevent similar events from occuring in the future.

lstone19 wrote:but how do you know there is a "stop signal violation alarm".

I work for a railroad too and I know dispatchers and the software they use to dispatch the railroad has an alarm that is tripped if a stop signal violation occurs.

I am nothing more than a railfan. The news at about 4:30 PM says the engineer of the commuter train "fell asleep". Is there not some kind of "dead man" device that would have kicked in and sent off alarms or even put the train into an emergency stop ? Also if an engineer in the cab had been stricken how would anyone else on the train have known ? Is not the conductor insulated from the cab back in the coaches ? Is there anyone else in that cab with the engineer ? Maybe having fireman in the cabs with the engineer is still a good idea. P.S. As nothing more than a rail fan I apologize for any ignorance of what actually goes on in train cabs ahead of time.

i forgot to ask this in my preivous post. Does anyone know the condition of the UP crew?

kevikens wrote:I am nothing more than a railfan. The news at about 4:30 PM says the engineer of the commuter train "fell asleep". Is there not some kind of "dead man" device that would have kicked in and sent off alarms or even put the train into an emergency stop ? Also if an engineer in the cab had been stricken how would anyone else on the train have known ? Is not the conductor insulated from the cab back in the coaches ? Is there anyone else in that cab with the engineer ? Maybe having fireman in the cabs with the engineer is still a good idea. P.S. As nothing more than a rail fan I apologize for any ignorance of what actually goes on in train cabs ahead of time.

I have no idea how anyone could possibly know that the engineer fell asleep. He was the only one there at the time. Is this just sensational speculation by the media, or possibly a figure of speech (i.e. "fell asleep at the wheel" - meaning that he was not paying attention)?

In any case, to answer your question - yes, there is a "deadman" feature that would stop the train if the engineer became incapacitated. It may be a foot pedal, that takes a good deal of pressure to keep pushed down, or it may be an intermittent alerter that has to be acknowledged within a short time frame, or a combination of both. Failure of either would result in an emergency brake application.

But, this early in the investigation, I'm finding it a bit hard to believe that anyone could possibly know that the engineer fell asleep.

By the way, don't apologize for ignorance of the ins and outs of rail operations. It was a good question to ask - if I heard that, I'd be asking questions too.

realtype wrote:This accident is eerily similar to the 1996 Amtrak Cap. Ltd./MARC accident in Silver Spring, MD on the CSX Metropolitan Sub. That engineer also coasted past a red signal, plowing into the nbound Amtrak train that was switching tracks at Georgetown Jct., killing himself and 10 other people. The MARC cab car looked a bit like that Bombardier except it was more sideswiped, rather than head-on. Ever since then MARC has been obsessed with safety as is regarded as one of the safest systems in the country. This CA Metrolink incident is definitely the worst passenger rail accident (in this country) since then. At the very least this incident will also help prevent similar events from occuring in the future.

Interestingly the MARC wreck occured only one week after the NJT incident at Bergen Jct. Both incidents were similar to yesterday's.