Metrolink Crash in Chatsworth, CA - 9/12/08

Sand Box John wrote:"NJTMatt", quote="jb9152"

It appears to me that your explanations of ATC is not a true ATC system but is a passive version of ATP. In the signal maintainer manuals that I have that were written for rapid transit ATC applacation, no speed commands / cab signals means stop. ATP in the same manuals allows the train engineer / operator to proceed with no speed commands / cab signals at restricted speed being prepared to stop at the next signal or obstruction.

In this particular case the signal was an interlocking signal. In my signal maintainer manuals interlocking signals are stop and stay signals.

Hey Sand Box. Are you a railroader? If not then please stop questioning testimony from fellow railroaders. Im a student engineer at Amtrak , having been an engineer at Septa for 4 years and I personally am good friends with NJT Matt and I know Silverliner 2 who is a CSX engineer. You are reading from rapid transit signal manuals which is a different signalling system altogether. In all the AMERICAN RAILROADS the only railroad in the country that has a cab signal that will prevent a stop signal over run is Amtrak on the NEC. Im not sure about that cab signal system Amtrak is using in Michagin.Yes on rapid transit line, its hard to run a stop signal but we arent talking about rapid transit and we arent talking about European rails.Although I was hired for Amtraks NEC I had to learn about the system in use in California as well. There is no cab signal rules in effect. Theres basically a magnet system on the side of the block signals ,along the tracks, which energizes something on the locomtive everytime you pass something that is less favorable then a clear signal.All this does is set an alarm off in the cab and the engineer has to simply acknowledge. If he doesnt acknowledge then the brakes come on. After you acknowledge, its doesnt keep you at a certain speed and doesnt prevent you running stop signals or head on collisions.Remember this isnt a cab signal but this was the only way that railroads who employ this system was only able to do over 79mph without cab signals.In my opinion its the poor man railroads signalling system, but even with cab signals if you come up to a stop signal, you will have a restricting code which limits the train to 20 mph and doesnt prevent a train from running a stop signal. In the end, its still up to the engineer to pay attention regardless if you have cabs or not.I know there will be changes in rules because of this accident. I feel sorry for everyone who was injured and killed, and I feel sorry fopr the kids who have to live the rest of there lives knowing that there text message could possibly have caused this. Its not there fault because its up to the engineer to ignore his/her phone while on the job.

USRailFan wrote:European ATS/ATC systems work the way Sand Box John described, with regard to passing a red signal. The split second the front of the train passes the red signal, full emergency braking is applied.

You noted the difference yourself. The European ATC system includes ATS - Automatic Train Stop. That's not the case with the overwhelming majority of American ATC installations. ATC is not a train stop methodology, it's a brake application methodology - it enforces brake applications within a certain time window. That brake application does not have to be to a stop. In fact, ATC doesn't know from a Stop signal.

Also, Sand Box John made some pithy little comment about how the original guy "didn't know" about ATC, when he himself demonstrated a lack of understanding of what ATC can and can't do. The main thing it can't do is to stop a train. That's why it's not called ATS or PTC. Some people, like SBJ, kick around terminology that they really don't know a lot about and come off looking a little foolish.

Sand Box John wrote:It appears to me that your explanations of ATC is not a true ATC system but is a passive version of ATP. In the signal maintainer manuals that I have that were written for rapid transit ATC applacation, no speed commands / cab signals means stop. ATP in the same manuals allows the train engineer / operator to proceed with no speed commands / cab signals at restricted speed being prepared to stop at the next signal or obstruction.

In this particular case the signal was an interlocking signal. In my signal maintainer manuals interlocking signals are stop and stay signals.

They say that because the rapid transit manuals that you are looking at are for ATC/ATS and possibly ATO operation. In general, in American railroading practice, ATC/cab signal CANNOT enforce a Stop signal - the most restrictive indication that you can receive in the cab is Restricting, which still allows you to run at 15 to 20 MPH depending on your rules governing restricted speed. A "true" ATC system, as you so confidently call it, is not an ATS system.

Your rapid transit manuals in this case are meaningless and frankly useless when it comes to a "no code" condition on a main line railroad application of ATC. ATC in main line railroading is a compromise between safety and efficiency; a failure of the cab signal apparatus in the field which results in a "no code" condition will still allow trains to move, albeit slowly (restricted speed), so the entire area doesn't have to come to a screeching halt. The rule covering restricted speed may differ in the maximum speed allowed depending on what rulebook you use, but it still mandates that the engineer control his/her train such that he/she can stop within one half the distance to another train, an obstruction, etc.

I have been tossing this question around in my head all day. If the metrolink train had a red signal. He was supposed to obviously stop and let the UP train proeceed past him corret? If this is correct then wouldn't the switch he went passed have been lined up for the freight?

Steve F45 wrote:I have been tossing this question around in my head all day. If the metrolink train had a red signal. He was supposed to obviously stop and let the UP train proeceed past him corret? If this is correct then wouldn't the switch he went passed have been lined up for the freight?

Some fellow railroad employees and I have been discussing that as well. I've read that the UP train was also moving at 40 MPH (presumably toward a switch reversed to allow him to enter the other main that the Metrolink train was *not* on), and Metrolink has said that their engineer ran past the Stop indication, so the only conclusion can be that the Metrolink train trailed through the reversed switch (assuming all of the signal and interlocking hardware was working as intended). Perhaps the loco broke the point locks, and they were just flapping back and forth. We'll know more once the NTSB inspects the switch and publishes their findings.

Steve F45 wrote:I have been tossing this question around in my head all day. If the metrolink train had a red signal. He was supposed to obviously stop and let the UP train proeceed past him corret? If this is correct then wouldn't the switch he went passed have been lined up for the freight?

Trailing through a reversed switch rarely does any damage to the train nor is there enough noise to notice.

BuddSilverliner269, jb9152

There appears to be a miss understanding at to what ATC, ATP means and what function it can do. My apologies.

In my rapid transit manuals ATC is Automatic Train Control, ATP is Automatic Train Protection, ATO is Automatic Train Operations. I made no mention of ATS. ATS is Automatic Train Supervision in my rapid transit manuals.

Thank you both for making it clear as to the differences.

Sand Box John wrote:BuddSilverliner269, jb9152

There appears to be a miss understanding at to what ATC, ATP means and what function it can do. My apologies.

In my rapid transit manuals ATC is Automatic Train Control, ATP is Automatic Train Protection, ATO is Automatic Train Operations. I made no mention of ATS. ATS is Automatic Train Supervision in my rapid transit manuals.

Thank you both for making it clear as to the differences.

No problem, my friend. Here's a tip - and it's meant with the best possible intentions. There are a ton of railroaders that post and read here. It's never a good idea to jump into a thread and tell someone they "obviously" don't know something. You may find that your own knowledge is incomplete or incorrect.

Although the crash is under investigation, officials said the engineer of the Metrolink train should have stopped at a rail siding to let the freight train pass, but that did not happen

http://www.myfoxla.com/myfox/pages/News ... geId=3.2.1

The collision occurred on a horseshoe-shaped section of track near a 500-foot-long tunnel underneath Stoney Point Park in the San Fernando Valley. There is a siding at one end of the tunnel where one train can wait for another to pass.

Higgins noted that a pair of "switches" that control whether a train goes into a siding were open. One of them should have been closed, she said.

"The indication is that it was forced open," possibly by the Metrolink train, she said of one of the switches.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/200 ... htm?csp=34

icgsteve wrote:Higgins noted that a pair of "switches" that control whether a train goes into a siding were open. One of them should have been closed, she said.

"The indication is that it was forced open," possibly by the Metrolink train, she said of one of the switches.

OK, that's pretty definitive. Put that data together with Metrolink's quick admission that its engineer ran a Stop indication, and it appears that it occurred just as we've been speculating. Now the question may become whether or not the engineer of the Metrolink train was distracted by texting, or if he just simply 'spaced out' and ran past a hard Stop. A review of radio logs will also show whether or not the engineer was calling out restrictive signal indications as he went. I'm not familiar with that territory, I think we can say that at the very least there would have been an Approach signal in advance of the Stop, and possibly even an Advance Approach in advance of the Approach indication. Was the engineer calling out signals?

I think this whole thing is heading toward quicker implementation of PTC, and some interim steps to be mandated soon, possibly as part of a new FRA Emergency Order.

jb9152 wrote:
OK, that's pretty definitive. Put that data together with Metrolink's quick admission that its engineer ran a Stop indication, and it appears that it occurred just as we've been speculating. Now the question may become whether or not the engineer of the Metrolink train was distracted by texting, or if he just simply 'spaced out' and ran past a hard Stop.

I think this whole thing is heading toward quicker implementation of PTC, and some interim steps to be mandated soon, possibly as part of a new FRA Emergency Order.

There maybe other factors at work here. The contractor has been expanding global operations rapidly, the quality of the management needs to be looked at as companies in rapid expansion often miss things. It has been reported that the company engineers that work Metrolink routinely violate FRA work hour rules. We don't know how closely Metrolink supervised the contractor. We don't know how hands on Metrolink is re safety of the operation.

I personally don't believe that commuter operators should be allowed to contract out except to Amtrak, as it used to be. We need to consider that law changes in Washington also play a part in this.

Hey folks-

Just a friendly reminder that this is a constantly evolving story, a horrible tragedy. Let's keep this in perspective, keep the conversation civil and the speculation to a minimum... thank you!

-otto-

Otto Vondrak wrote:Hey folks-

Just a friendly reminder that this is a constantly evolving story, a horrible tragedy. Let's keep this in perspective, keep the conversation civil and the speculation to a minimum... thank you!

-otto-

Agreed. I don't think it's useful at this point to be speculating about alleged FRA violations or the quality of management at Veolia.

Don't some railroads use a "de-railer" to stop a train attempting to trail through a reversed switch? Would this have been practical in this location? Would it have made a difference?

What about communications and dispatching? Aren't tight communications maintained between both trains and the HQ to know who's on the move, who's going into the hole, heads-up, etc, etc? Or perhaps things happened so quick here there was no margin for error?

Question about the Metrolink bilevels - are these bilevels any similar to those used on TriRail, NJT or CalTrans?

BlockLine_4111 wrote: What about communications and dispatching? Aren't tight communications maintained between both trains and the HQ to know who's on the move, who's going into the hole, heads-up, etc, etc? Or perhaps things happened so quick here there was no margin for error?

Question about the Metrolink bilevels - are these bilevels any similar to those used on TriRail, NJT or CalTrans?

I would like to know more about communications and dispatching too. I would think the dispatcher would have seen what was going on and alerted someone(but I could be wrong)?

the bilevels used by metrolink are similar to those used by yes Caltrans and Trirail also GO Transit, Sounder, and many more. NJT uses its own special design.