1 Train Collision 1/4/24

I received an email to our rr.net email account ([email protected]) from the Gothamist. I could not find a corresponding article on their site, and since it's an email and not an article, I will share the complete contents concerning the topic at hand.

A play by play of last week’s derailment on the 1 line
By Clayton Guse

Last week’s subway crash on the Upper West Side gummed up commutes for thousands of New Yorkers — and prompted federal regulators to launch an aggressive safety probe that gained new urgency after an F train derailed in Coney Island on Wednesday.

Unlike many collisions and derailments in the subway’s 120-year history, last Thursday’s calamity didn’t happen in a flash. Rather, the slow-moving crash was the culmination of dozens of decisions over nearly an hour.

Internal MTA records obtained by Gothamist, accounts from the National Transportation Safety Board and interviews with transit employees offer a detailed timeline of events leading up to the Jan. 4 incident.
2:10 p.m.
A 10-car train on the 1 line comes to a screeching halt near the 79th Street station. The train operator alerts the subway’s rail control center that “unruly persons” made their way into an unused conductor cab and activated the emergency brakes.
2:15 p.m.
The train’s operator and conductor go onto the tracks and reset the brake valve on the subway car, but the train still isn’t working. They tell the control center they suspect a homeless person pulled the brake and request additional help.
2:35 p.m.
An inspector on the scene alerts dispatchers that multiple emergency brakes have been activated on the train. Transit workers attempt to reset all the tripped brake valves, which takes at least eight minutes. The brakes on the third car from the front of the train cannot be reset.

Transit managers decide to fully deactivate the first five cars on the train. That means a supervisor must drive the train blind from the sixth car. An operator in the front car serves as the supervisor’s eyes and ears, directing him over radio. The train pulls into the 79th Street station to let out the passengers.
2:47 p.m.
The crew continues north, with plans to park the train beneath 103rd Street on a track not used for passenger service before eventually continuing to the 240th Street subway yard in the Bronx.
2:59 p.m.
Just north of 96th street, the supervisor – who is driving blind and relying on the operator – begins to transfer to the unused track.

A 1 train carrying roughly 200 passengers is moving through the same crossing, transferring from the express track to the local track. The disabled train passes through three signals designed to stop trains when they don’t have clearance. The two trains crash into each other at a slow speed.

The disabled train is shoved into the tunnel wall, and its front car is lifted upwards. The train with passengers aboard is also shoved off the tracks.

“I told you to stop and stay,” the operator at the front of the disabled train says.

At least 24 people are injured.
5:15 p.m.
Hundreds of riders are escorted out of the subway tunnel. The scene is flooded with FDNY and MTA crews.
The aftermath
National Transportation Review Board investigators are on the scene the next day. NSTB Chair Jennifer Homendy makes comments that raise eyebrows among transit insiders. Her team’s investigation will not be limited to the Jan. 4 derailment. “This is the second accident on New York City Transit’s property in 37 days,” she said, referring to a subway track worker who was dragged and killed by a train near the 34th Street-Herald Square subway station on Nov. 29.

“We are going to want to look at the entire system, including how it is managed and supervised,” Homendy announces.

Full service won’t be restored on the 1 line until late Saturday night.

The following Wednesday, a train on the F line derailed in Coney Island, jumping the tracks and landing just feet from the edge of the line’s elevated structure.

"Derailments do happen. They shouldn't, but they do from time to time," NYC Transit President Richard Davey says after the F train derailment. "Customers should feel safe taking the subway."

This gets into my last reply's question: Why did nobody contact control to block off the traffic first before allowing the disabled train to be moved out of 95th and perform the 4-to-M crossover near 103rd? I mean, that disabled train was basically manual operation.

NTSB going deep on this one is going to be worth it.

Mr Davey used to be GM of the MBTA, albeit a dozen years ago, and they are having major safety issues too.

STrRedWolf wrote: ↑Fri Jan 12, 2024 9:27 am This gets into my last reply's question: Why did nobody contact control to block off the traffic first before allowing the disabled train to be moved out of 95th and perform the 4-to-M crossover near 103rd? I mean, that disabled train was basically manual operation.

From the sound of things, the disabled train was supposed to stop short of the crossover north of 96th to allow the service train to go ahead of it, but failed to do so for reasons yet to be determined.

This is a repeat of an 1970 accident. That accident was before operator locations had radios,

https://www.bing.com/images/search?q=ne ... RE&first=1

BandA wrote: ↑Fri Jan 12, 2024 12:49 pm Mr Davey used to be GM of the MBTA, albeit a dozen years ago, and they are having major safety issues too.

The MBTA issue is two fold. First is the infrastructure neglect due to the past Governors/Legislatures lack of commitment to public transportation. Second is safety and brain drain. It seems in the past 8 to 10 years there has been a push to get rid of the high timers and this was amplified with COVID. The personnel that knew how to run an operation took early retirement and got out. Now crews have a short experience curve and the knowledge of the elders wasn't passed down.

Now to the 1 Train...
What was the operational experience of the TO, TSS and Operations personnel? If they are high timers then they should have known better. But the stress of keeping the lines clear add to the situation.

The NTSB will generate their report , the NYCT will react to it and hopefully we will be safe.

It would be interesting to see in this post-COVID world are accidents on public transit system higher or lower.

west point wrote: ↑Thu Jan 11, 2024 11:08 pm I really believe that the trip arm would have retracted once the front section passed the arm's sensor location. That is based on what I have observed.

I don't think so because the trip arm only retracts if the signal changes to a proceed indication which didn't happen. A "dead" train passing by would not cause the arm to retract. Anyone knows different, please correct me.

Head-end View wrote: ↑Fri Jan 12, 2024 8:25 pm

west point wrote: ↑Thu Jan 11, 2024 11:08 pm I really believe that the trip arm would have retracted once the front section passed the arm's sensor location. That is based on what I have observed.

I don't think so because the trip arm only retracts if the signal changes to a proceed indication which didn't happen. A "dead" train passing by would not cause the arm to retract. Anyone knows different, please correct me.

Thus why I ask why wasn't the movement blocked off. Yeah, you would of delayed some trains and pissed off some New Yorkers, but it would of been much safer to execute. Besides, no matter what you do, you're going to piss off a New Yorker. Why they didn't do that when it was known the front was dead escapes me...

MBTA3247 wrote: ↑Fri Jan 12, 2024 5:07 pm From the sound of things, the disabled train was supposed to stop short of the crossover north of 96th to allow the service train to go ahead of it, but failed to do so for reasons yet to be determined.

I think the point being made here is that they should have held back all the other trains to get the disabled train into the clear rather than expecting to stop short of anything.

"I told you to stop and hold".

I realize transit is a "different world" from freight but let's look at this through freight eyes. We have a cut of 5 cars to be shoved, with the engine the 6th piece back. Assuming they have track authority, an employee on the lead car would confirm radio communication with the engineer, then tell them to shove ahead (or back up, depending on how the engine was pointed) a given number of carlengths. If the engineer does not hear further communication within HALF that distance, he/she is to stop.

This train reportedly went through multiple stop indications. Either the employee in the lead did not tell the engineer (motorman, operator, what ever you call it) or the engineer didn't respond.

The discussion of shutting down other tracks is not really the issue. The proximate cause of the wreck is the failure of the disabled train to stop short of signals or indications that would have halted it safely. That failure to stop was due to a lack of understanding and/or communication between the operator and the person riding the lead car.

Safe to say, Mr. BR&P, we are addressing a "held from service" followed by a "discipline of dismissal assessed" situation.

But watch that Motorman simply "get 60 days".

Gilbert B Norman wrote:Safe to say, Mr. BR&P, we are addressing a "held from service" followed by a "discipline of dismissal assessed" situation. But watch that Motorman simply "get 60 days".

Indeed, the consequences could make a whole separate (and lengthy) discussion.

Two sentences from Jeff Smith's post above get to the core of it:

"An operator in the front car serves as the supervisor’s eyes and ears, directing him over radio.... The disabled train passes through three signals designed to stop trains when they don’t have clearance."

If the story quoted in that post is accurate, it raises an interesting point. Assuming the job titles are correct, it says under the scenario described a supervisor must drive the train from the sixth car. An operator in the lead car protects the movement. Would the supervisor have been a qualified operator? Would it have been better if the supervisor was riding the first car, and the operator was on the 6th car controlling the equipment? Did the operator not tell the supervisor to stop, did the supervisor not hear the command to stop, or did the supervisor disregard the command to stop? None of us are in a position to say, but it will likely be one (or more) of those 3 things.

And it would seem there was not a proper "job briefing" as they call it these days, to be sure everybody involved was on the same page before making the move.

lensovet wrote: ↑Sun Jan 14, 2024 1:34 am I think the point being made here is that they should have held back all the other trains to get the disabled train into the clear rather than expecting to stop short of anything.

Exactly! The disable train should have had the full right of way and had been put onto a clear track before any other trains got in the way. This would of prevented the accident.

That said... CTBC is radio based. This makes me wonder... Can a portable temporary transponder be put on the disabled "forward" side of the train to relay back to supervisor/operator 5 cars back? That way the person back there knows what the signal is at the head end of the train.

Exactly! The disable train should have had the full right of way and had been put onto a clear track before any other trains got in the way. This would of prevented the accident.

"Got in the way"?? The other train didn't "get in the way", the disabled train was where it had no right to be.

If those operating the disabled train had followed rules and stopped where they should have, they could run trains on the other track all day long without an incident. Why all the thought of halting the whole route and bringing in portable transponders and such? All it takes is for people to do their jobs the right way. I've never seen a rulebook for the system but would bet any amount you name that there are rules and procedures ALREADY IN PLACE that - if followed - would have avoided this incident.

Someone mentioned above that the train operator may only get a two month suspension. Might not be enough by some standards, but it is a punch in the gut. Person loses two months consecutive pay for the year. How many here could handle that without difficulty?

Also re: the failure or lack of radio communication. My guess is that either one radio failed or the other, OR the train op didn't realize his volume was turned down too low to hear or he didn't realize the radio was turned off. Or maybe it was set on the wrong channel which I know from personal experience can happen all too easily.

One would hope they would have done a "radio check" to be sure that communications were working before starting the train movement. But I seriously doubt he would have deliberately ignored repeated orders to stop if he heard them.