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Discussion relating to the past and present operations of the NYC Subway, PATH, and Staten Island Railway (SIRT).

Moderator: GirlOnTheTrain

 #1636663  by BR&P
 
Head-end View wrote: re: the failure or lack of radio communication. My guess is that either one radio failed or the other, OR the train op didn't realize his volume was turned down too low to hear or he didn't realize the radio was turned off. Or maybe it was set on the wrong channel which I know from personal experience can happen all too easily.

One would hope they would have done a "radio check" to be sure that communications were working before starting the train movement. But I seriously doubt he would have deliberately ignored repeated orders to stop if he heard them.
If the radio was on the wrong channel or set too low, not only would the rulebook-mandated radio check have disclosed that, but how would the person operating the controls know enough to begin the shove?

If the communication failed after the move began, I can't believe their rulebook does not have some provision for halting the move. On freight lines, it's half the specified distance. If the instruction is to shove 10 carlengths and nothing more is heard within 5, move must stop.

It's not rocket science. There's an old saying the rules are written in blood. Somebody on the disabled train didn't know their rules or chose to ignore them. But I already said that.

Wonder how long it will take the STB to issue a preliminary finding? (The final reports on these things always seem to take forever).
 #1636682  by Gilbert B Norman
 
BR&P wrote: Sun Jan 14, 2024 8:17 pm Wonder how long it will take the STB to issue a preliminary finding? (The final reports on these things always seem to take forever).
Come on, Mr BR&P, as you appear to be actively employed within the industry in the T&E crafts.

Don't you want the Board to "get it right", especially since, and even though the Board's reports are inadmissible at a "fair and impartial hearing" :-D, they have their "way" of influencing how much an accused's livelihood will be affected?
 #1636687  by BR&P
 
I'm sure the Board WILL get it right. But unless things have changed, the company hearings ("Investigation" was the term I'm familiar with, but no doubt there are other terms as well) are held much sooner than the fed's determination. Those who may be held out of service pending a hearing likely would not want to wait months or a year before a resolution. Altho these days they have "out of service insurance". And as you correctly point out, the company and the government hearings are separate and unrelated, at least officially.
 #1636691  by STrRedWolf
 
BR&P wrote: Sun Jan 14, 2024 6:10 pm
Exactly! The disable train should have had the full right of way and had been put onto a clear track before any other trains got in the way. This would of prevented the accident.
"Got in the way"?? The other train didn't "get in the way", the disabled train was where it had no right to be.

If those operating the disabled train had followed rules and stopped where they should have, they could run trains on the other track all day long without an incident. Why all the thought of halting the whole route and bringing in portable transponders and such? All it takes is for people to do their jobs the right way. I've never seen a rulebook for the system but would bet any amount you name that there are rules and procedures ALREADY IN PLACE that - if followed - would have avoided this incident.
All this talk is simple: FORCE people to do the right thing because there is no other option. The disabled train was clogging a major local line. To get it rolling again they had to make it dangerous and to operate it was even more so. The only option here was to hold trains on track 3 while the disabled train went from track 4 to M in one movement. Any trip-arms would of thrown on track M instead of track 4 while the disabled section of the train was in the interlock.

No, and I bet the rules & procedures did not account for radio comms cutting out in the middle of the move. I bet the operator was screaming his head off to stop the damn train. If the rules & procedures are to have a disabled train in mixed traffic instead of having it move only when it is fully cleared and traffic held so it could get out of harms way quickly without stoppage (ether to a side track unused in normal circumstances or straight into the repair yard) then I contend the rules & procedures need to be rewritten for safer operation in this instance.
 #1636698  by BR&P
 
STrRedWolf wrote: No, and I bet the rules & procedures did not account for radio comms cutting out in the middle of the move. I bet the operator was screaming his head off to stop the damn train.
Does anybody have access to the rulebook which would apply here? I can only speak on how it's done on "regular" railroads rather than transit. On those lines, the rules absolutely DO account for loss of communication during the move. I went through this above but will lay it out again as you may have missed it.

1. The supervisor and the operator (and any other employees affected) should have had a "job briefing" discussing what they would do and how it would be done.

2. With the supervisor at the controls and the operator in the lead car they would perform a radio check, to be sure they had communication both ways.

3. I don't know how transit guys in the tunnels calculate distance. Do they count carlengths, support poles, lights, whatever? Let's say there are lights on the walls at regular intervals. The operator can see 6 lights and it's all clear so he tells the spvr to shove 6 lights.

4. While shoving, if the spvr does not hear more info - if the communication fails - he is to stop within THREE lights - half the distance which was known to be safe. In most cases, in about 3 lights the op would say something like "Still clear for 6 lights" so the spvr could continue the shove another THREE lights and so on. If he doesn't hear more, he STOPS.

5. The "Gothamist" report quoted (which is what I'm basing my discussion on) states the train passed 3 signals designed to stop trains when they didn't have clearance. I presume this means the automatic trips - but do each of those have a visual aspect as well - a red light for example? How far apart are they? From that article, it suggests the supervisor just kept shoving blindly despite having no communication from the op, for a considerable distance. If that is the case, there's your cause.
Any trip-arms would of thrown on track M instead of track 4 while the disabled section of the train was in the interlock.
You'll have to translate that for this above-ground guy. I've been to NYC a few times, have ridden the subway as a passenger but really am not familiar with how the systems work.

As for shutting down traffic - hey, no doubt that would have avoided the incident. When you are in your car, do you stop at each green light, in case somebody runs through the red? Obviously your car doesn't have 200 people on board but at what point do you rely on people to do their job right? At what point do you say "What if...." and shut down additional operations? How rare is a disabled train? My guess is it happens frequently. Do they shut everything down every time?

Like I said it's a different type of action and totally foreign to me. I'm willing to let others decide what degree of redundant precaution should be taken. But it seems - again basing my opinion on what we read - there was some terribly sloppy "railroading" in the operation of the disabled train which caused the collision.
 #1636700  by Gilbert B Norman
 
Mr. BR&P, it's been a while, and I'm not saying I was aware of it happening, but from my three years in Labor Relations where I was reviewing appeals and writing Submissions when some (sorry) clown wanted to take his case "off the property", I would not put it past one to grab on to an NTSB Report and try to use it as a base to have seniority restored along with a financial settlement for time lost.
 #1636702  by BR&P
 
Oh I dare say a very thick book could be written on the various cases, decisions and reversals over the years, and the creative ways used to try to overturn various outcomes. With some, you can only shake your head. And yes, sometimes things which seemed to be long settled are exhumed for a fresh round of contention.

As for the company's investigations, I have been on both sides of the table. I have presided over a few, and at a few I have been the "invited guest of honor" :wink:

My railroad earnings these days are delivered via the RRB. My first railroad paycheck was labeled "NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY" and rewarded me at the princely rate of $2.92 an hour.
Last edited by BR&P on Mon Jan 15, 2024 2:20 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 #1636708  by hxa
 
BR&P wrote: Mon Jan 15, 2024 11:08 am
5. The "Gothamist" report quoted (which is what I'm basing my discussion on) states the train passed 3 signals designed to stop trains when they didn't have clearance. I presume this means the automatic trips - but do each of those have a visual aspect as well - a red light for example? How far apart are they? From that article, it suggests the supervisor just kept shoving blindly despite having no communication from the op, for a considerable distance. If that is the case, there's your cause.
I'd assume the three overrunned signals were all platform signals of the 96th street station, the last (288) being the interlocking home signal. Basically the train wasn't cleared for berthing at 96th station, yet it did anyway.
(181.35 KiB) Not downloaded yet
 #1636722  by Gilbert B Norman
 
Question, Mr. BR&P.

Are NYCTA Operating Employees covered by Agreement (of course they are) and (what I don't know) were they negotiated under provisions within the Railway Labor Act?

I should also note, my use of the term "hearing" was incorrect and yours's of "investigation" is more to the point.

Here from my MILW-UTU Agreement dated January 1, 1973 ("squealer", Chief Clerk, never knew I had it, or he would have grabbed it when I resigned Dec 31, 1981) is the applicable language.

Except as herein provided, an employee will not be held out of service prior to a fair and impartial investigation and subsequent written decision as provided by this Article, except for the following causes:

Rule G

Theft

Conduct in the performance of duties threating the safety of other employees or interferes with the operation of the railroad.


Finally, so far as "me and the MILW" goes, I of course when hiring on after college, I thought I had a career for life. It was a lot of fun - for a while. But after the Bankruptcy ('77) it became a "who's on first" charade. "Who's been purged?' (try a boss who looked out for me) and rather than waiting until "The End" on Dec 31, 1985, I took matters into my own hands (resigned Dec '81 as noted), and with a CPA that I had since '74, went into private practice.
 #1636723  by BR&P
 
Sir - I was drawn to the thread after seeing headlines and figuring this forum might have better info than the various news media. I stayed aboard as it seemed there are some similarities, as well as differences, between this incident and the type of railroading I am familiar with.

I have the deepest respect for those involved with subterranean operations (yes, I do know parts of it are on or well above ground level, too). But frankly I know close to nothing about how it works, which is why I have offered several disclaimers and have kept my conclusions hypothetical and conditional. Looking at it through Class I and Shortline eyes, it seems pretty cut and dried provided the Gothamist article is complete and accurate. (I have long ago learned NOT to believe everything you read!)

So I don't know whether this is strictly a rank-and-file issue or if it goes beyond that. How high up the food chain was the "supervisor"? Was he/she represented, or not? Was THAT supervisor perhaps acting under orders or misinformation from even higher?

Sometimes these things can be very simple and very complicated at the same time.
 #1636725  by justalurker66
 
hxa wrote: Mon Jan 15, 2024 1:18 pm
BR&P wrote: Mon Jan 15, 2024 11:08 amDoes anybody have access to the rulebook which would apply here?
There's an old version of the rulebook:
http://thehasbeen.org:9090/wordpress/wp ... GSOCRd.pdf
Specific rule (#51) - 1998 version
MTA-RULE51.jpg
MTA-RULE51.jpg (112.5 KiB) Viewed 381 times
Lead cab controls the brakes, pushing cab controls the throttle. Third employee relays signals. In this case it sounds like the brakes were out on the lead cars.

Pushing to the nearest station and discharging passengers was done correctly.
Pushing to the next nearest siding was in progress.

A portion of Rule 39 covers "Running trains from other than the front end".
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