1 Train Collision 1/4/24

I think you hit the nail on the head here in three ways: Why wasn't the way made clear and trains held to let this one get off the line? Was there something else wrong that made this train unable to stop? Why did communications die?

NTSB's report will be very interesting.

I've heard the rumor mill around the property, including things said by people who responded - we'll see what comes to light with the NTSB report.

We'll also see what heads roll and where.

NTSB Preliminary: Railway Age

NTSB Issues Preliminary Report on NYCT Train-to-Train Collision


...
At about 2:11 p.m., train 1345 was running in revenue service when an “unruly passenger“ triggered an emergency braking application by pulling the emergency brake valve cords within the first five railcars, according to the NTSB, which noted that the cords are accessible to passengers within each car. Unable to reset the emergency braking application, the train operator moved the train to 79th Street Station and offloaded all passengers. A NYCT railcar inspector arrived on scene but was also unable to reset the brakes, NTSB reported; the train was placed into “bad order“ or out-of-service status.

“The operations control center instructed the railcar inspector to cut out the brakes and traction motors on the five railcars in the front portion of the train so it could be operated,” according to the NTSB. “The inspector was then instructed to move the out-of-service train to a rail yard for repairs. After the railcar inspector performed the cut out, train 1345 departed 79th Street Station at restricted speed, northbound on track 4 toward 96th Street Station, destined for a nearby yard.” NTSB noted that under NYCT operating rules, “restricted speed requires a crew to operate a train below 10 mph and at a speed that allows them to stop with one-half the range of vision.” According to the federal agency, the transit system supervisor was operating the controls of the sixth railcar. The flagger was positioned in the lead railcar and communicating with the transit system supervisor to coordinate the train’s movements.

In interviews with NTSB investigators, “the flagger said he lost radio communications with the transit system supervisor near 96th Street Station,” according to the federal agency. “The transit system supervisor did not receive the flagger’s instruction to stop, the train passed by a signal requiring a stop at the end of the 96th Street Station platform, and the collision occurred. The track in the area was equipped with trip-stops, which activate a train’s emergency brakes if the train passes through a signal requiring a stop. Because the brakes on the first five railcars had been cut out, emergency brakes could not be activated by the trip-stop.”
...

Can't wait until they release to report on the radios involved including the antennas.
Does anyone know if those conversations are recorded? My guess would say probably no due to the complexity of the system (number of trains, routes and probably channels etc.)

Question; even thou the distance between the rear and head end is slight, the fact it was a xover move between tunnels, could it be possible that it was in a 'dead spot'?

videobruce wrote: ↑Sun Jan 28, 2024 11:12 am Can't wait until they release to report on the radios involved including the antennas.
Does anyone know if those conversations are recorded? My guess would say probably no due to the complexity of the system (number of trains, routes and probably channels etc.)

Question; even thou the distance between the rear and head end is slight, the fact it was a xover move between tunnels, could it be possible that it was in a 'dead spot'?

I opine that it would make eminent sense to acquire radios that ping each other every second or three and provide an audible alarm to advise the radio user(s) to immediately apply the brakes and stop if the ping is not received.

Docket link: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pag ... MR004.aspx

Condensing it down:

• Train 1427 (10-car consist w/operator, conductor, and about 200 passengers) was crossing over from track 3 to 4 when train 1345 (disabled 10 car consist with a system supervisor, an operator as a flagger, a conductor, and a rail car inspector onboard) overran a red light and hit it, on Jan 4th 2024 around 3pm.
• 1345 had an unruly passenger pull the emergency break around 2:11pm.
• Due to issues with resetting the application of the emergency brakes, the operator moved the car to 79th Street and offloaded passengers.
• Railcar inspector came, tried to fix the issues, but ended up taking 1345 out of service.
• Operations Control Center had the inspector cut out all the breaks in the first five cars, have the operator be a flagger, the system supervisor operate from the 6th car, and proceed at restricted speed per signaling.
• Personnel on board were using radios, not sound-activated phones.
• Operator/flagger lost radio comms around 96th street.
• Signals were at STOP indicator at the end of 96th street.
• Trip-stop did not deploy because of the cut-out systems on the first five cars.

Okay, my opinion on this:

• We now know why they didn't lock down the line until the 1345 was out of the way: the move started at 79th street, 15+ blocks away. They were supposed to stop at the station but overran that. Did operations tell them what the plan was?
• They were using radios. Why? Why not the sound-activated phone? I'm assuming this is basically a land-line between all the cars. Also, why did the radio cut out around this area? Is there interference in this area?
• Why was an operator being a flagger when the rulebook says the operator goes back and someone else flags?
• Why did the supervisor NOT stop when contact was lost?

That said...

The National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation is ongoing. Future investigative activity will focus on NYCT’s operating procedures when moving bad order cars, radio communication procedures, mechanical procedures when placing a revenue train in bad order status, and the lack of federal requirements for railcar event recorders on FTA regulated properties.

I now wonder... what's the shortest consist that runs on this line? Because now it's getting to be "Get a shortie to hook up and drag this consist to the yard" would of been the best option.

Ken W2KB wrote: ↑Sun Jan 28, 2024 12:39 pm I opine that it would make eminent sense to acquire radios that ping each other every second or three and provide an audible alarm to advise the radio user(s) to immediately apply the brakes and stop if the ping is not received.

I could see that would be a nightmare full of false 'pings' starting off with dead spots. Between that and all the HV arching subways are known for that occur. Even if something could be developed.

Ok, I give up; what's a "sound operated phone"???

videobruce wrote: ↑Sun Jan 28, 2024 1:39 pm

Ken W2KB wrote: ↑Sun Jan 28, 2024 12:39 pm I opine that it would make eminent sense to acquire radios that ping each other every second or three and provide an audible alarm to advise the radio user(s) to immediately apply the brakes and stop if the ping is not received.

I could see that would be a nightmare full of false 'pings' starting off with dead spots. Between that and all the HV arching subways are known for that occur. Even if something could be developed.

Electric arcs are not continuous and even if they were, do not generate interference above 1 GHz leaving ample radio spectrum for use, and the large majority of dead spot issues could be resolved by running higher transmit power, say 10 or 20 watts and higher gain directional antennas. The task of developing a digital system and radios would not be complex or difficult for an engineer skilled in RF digital technology. For those few instances when a dead spot unavoidably may occur, personnel would have to contact each other directly.

I was reading on a radio forum about why, despite that being a recommended practice in the AAR, such radios didn't get adopted by railroads--everything has to switch to that new radio system, and if the NYMTA is anything like other railroads, there's lots of line side equipment that uses the existing radios for other-than-voice communications from operators, and lots of radios to upgrade, so it could be decades after introducing new radios that people can finally stop carrying two radios, or needing to ensure that only certain equipment is used on certain lines.

Nah, go back to Train Orders and Block Stations.

STrRedWolf wrote: ↑Sun Jan 28, 2024 1:21 pm* Why did the supervisor NOT stop when contact was lost?

Did the supervisor operating the train know that contact was lost?
What was the actual procedure in place to verify contact had not been lost?
(Not some fictional system that does not exist or procedures used on other railroads. What was the procedure on this line at the time of the incident for verifying contact has not been lost between two radios.)

STrRedWolf wrote: ↑Sun Jan 28, 2024 1:21 pmI now wonder... what's the shortest consist that runs on this line? Because now it's getting to be "Get a shortie to hook up and drag this consist to the yard" would of been the best option.

IIRC these are five car sets that normally operate in pairs creating a 10 car train. Using a "shortie" of any length to connect to the front of the train would require taking another train out of passenger service and somehow coordinating the connection of the two trains. Where would this connection be made?

Are you proposing that the train be left at 79th St until a rescue train could be taken out of service and reversed down track 4, connected to the damaged train, then pulled north into the center track where they were planning on storing the damaged train? Or would the damaged train be allowed to proceed to 96th St and wait there for this theoretical "shortie" to come to the rescue?

Simple logistics would be to allow the damaged train to proceed to 96th where it would stop and stay until it could be crossed over and stored on the center track. Unfortunately the stop and stay did not occur.

Please consider what your answer would have been three weeks ago BEFORE the outcome of the actual actions followed was known. As stated before, it is easy to make decisions AFTER an incident.

justalurker66 wrote: ↑Sun Jan 28, 2024 9:07 pm IIRC these are five car sets that normally operate in pairs creating a 10 car train. Using a "shortie" of any length to connect to the front of the train would require taking another train out of passenger service and somehow coordinating the connection of the two trains. Where would this connection be made?

Are you proposing that the train be left at 79th St until a rescue train could be taken out of service and reversed down track 4, connected to the damaged train, then pulled north into the center track where they were planning on storing the damaged train? Or would the damaged train be allowed to proceed to 96th St and wait there for this theoretical "shortie" to come to the rescue?

Simple logistics would be to allow the damaged train to proceed to 96th where it would stop and stay until it could be crossed over and stored on the center track. Unfortunately the stop and stay did not occur.

Please consider what your answer would have been three weeks ago BEFORE the outcome of the actual actions followed was known. As stated before, it is easy to make decisions AFTER an incident.

BEFORE I had thought the miscreant yanked the emergency brake just south of 96th. NOW I know it was much farther south.

I also consider the operator to know more on handling the train than the supervisor, who's probably rusty at this point.

Here's what I would have done after the passengers were offloaded onto 79th (AFTER the latest report, and it has changed):

1. Supervisor is flagger, operator is in 6th car. Soundphone being used.
2. Move is only approved up to and into 96th street, and clearly communicated to the four people on that consist.
3. OCC is contacted when the consists is in 96th street so that signaling and interlocks are set for the next move: 4 to M, then M up to 137th street.
4. OCC is contacted again for directions to park the consist at 137th yard.

From there, the consist is out of the way for work forces to repair in situ, break up a spare 10 car consist to make a functional 10 car consist and a head-end-operational consist, or wait for a rescue engine. The latter two are for moving the consist up to the 240th street yard for repairs.

Conductor should have been in the cab of the fifth car where the PA and buzzer were working to transmit messages to the TSS in the cab directly behind them. I've said that since day one. The electrical portions were pulled for some unknown reason - so it wouldn't have worked train line, but the buzzer, PA and IC would have worked within the same 5 car set. Conductor could have been standing between the fifth and sixth car as an extra line of communication.

Cutting a spare train set was likely not an option - since the derailment, the line is down 2 sets and trips are cancelled everyday because of it - there really isn't any wiggle room in the fleet on a good day - as it stands, there are two R62 sets borrowed from the 3 line that were reassigned to the 240 yard fleet on a long term basis even before this incident. This happened at the exact time that 240 yard is being emptied out for the PM rush - and they use every available good repair train on a daily basis.

Train Service Supervisors are required to operate trains every so often to maintain their operational skills and they get far more instruction in these oddball moves than road crews do, so he wasn't rusty on train operation.

I see this has some new info, so we know SOME of the rest of the story.

While not directly responsible for the collision, I have a couple questions for those familiar with the equipment. Does pulling the emergency cord trigger an airbrake action, an electric action, or both? Or is the braking all electric? Why was it impossible to reset the system? I would guess that the emergency apparatus on each car must be tested at some specified interval - monthly, annual, whatever. * In theory* it should have been a simple matter of resetting the various devices which had been activated, right? Any guesses on why they could not be reset?