MAGLEV Test Track Lathen Emsland

The following article has some very concerning statements about the accident:
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L23838223.htm
including following:
A state prosecutors' office spokesman said the control station knew the maintenance truck was on the track when the train began its run and this had been noted in a handwritten log. The truck was visible on a control station monitor, he said.

"It must now be explained why the workers in the control station allowed the Transrapid to depart at 9:53 a.m. (0753 GMT) even though the obstacle was on the track," said the spokesman, Alexander Retemeyer.

The workers in the control booth were in shock and not up to questioning. They would be questioned next week, Retemeyer said.

DutchRailnut wrote:(excerpt) ... yes this collision was caused by human error but with regular railroads this type of collision is hardly possible due to ordinairy track detection. ...

Dutch, it's a test track, but it carries passengers. How can it operate without safeguards in place? Is it exempt from normal regulations, just governed by policy from the companies? No cab signalling, no track detection, no onboard operator ... just boggles the mind!
I wonder if the Pueblo Railroad Test Track (RTT) is as poorly run?

Currently, only a broken rail detection system exists on the RTT. This system will provide limited track occupancy information by detecting loss of shunt, thus yielding a location resolution of 1 mile.

from: http://www.volpe.dot.gov/gps/gpsmts.html

Keotaman

In puelo GCOR rules prevail and even with only one train on the track they have safeguards to only have one occupant.
and no bloody tourist like this transrapid.
Pueblo is only a proving ground not a proving ground for public opinion.

Well, that's part of the answer, thanks.

The question on my mind that hasn't been addressed is the question of the maintenance platform...

Was it on the track or suspended over it (or in close proximity to the guideway) in such a way that it would not come in contact with the guideway or other sensory devices and thus trigger the safety systems (or whatever the technical term for the Automatic Train Stop on the maglev systems is called...)? (From what I've read about the Maglev system, the trains stop, or slow down, if another train is in close proximity to their "block" (or whatever an energized segment of track is called) thus preventing trains from colliding with one another).

Even if it was resting on the guideway, did it contact any of the anciliary track components (like the magnets) that would have set off dectectors and other tracking equipment? Another factor to consider.


Now, I'm sorry if my questions seem naive, but I'm not up on all the details of this particular Maglev and am more familiar with the test trains in Yamanashi (the Japanese test trains/track in Japan's Aichi Prefecture). I'm assuming that the maintenance platform is a piece of equipment that is not, in itself, a maglev vehicle and is a mobile, yet removiable vehicle that may travel on the guideway, or is moved by a crane adjacent to the track. Or, may I assume that the platform is indeed a Maglev vehicle?

(And yes, I know what happens when one assumes...)

Komachi wrote:(excerpt)The question on my mind that hasn't been addressed is the question of the maintenance platform ...

Judging by one of the pictures in GeorgeF's second link, it looks like a self (diesel?)-propelled flatcar type of platform. I, too, am wondering how the maglev could have been "at speed" with an object on the track.


Caption: The wreckage of the maintenance vehicle of a high-speed magnetic train is transported away at the elevated tracks in Lathen, northwestern Germany, on Friday Sept. 22, 2006, after the train went off the tracks, killing one person and injuring up to 25 others, some of them seriously, according to police. The train, carrying 29 people, apparently hit an obstacle on the tracks, police spokesman Martin Ratermann said. Firefighters were using ladders to reach the injured at the accident site on an elevated track. (AP Photo/Joerg Sarbach)

I wouldn't be too quick to erase Maglev technology because of the German collision with a maintenance vehicle. This was surely an "accident" in every sense of the word, and not a "malfunction". If the Maglev proponents previously called the Maglev "accident-proof", that was a ridiculous statement since we all know that that is a phenomenon that is physically impossible due to the law of physics. Ask any of the Titanic survivors( if you could )if their "unsinkable" liner could possibly sink. In spite of high-energy consumption at high-speeds and possibly a lack of computerized sensing of vehicles on the right of way (a possible need for improvement), I believe that Maglev shows considerable promise with potential high-speed, frictionless propulsion which hypothetically could get you from Boston to San Francisco overnight while you safely slept in a smooth coach. Railroads in the 1800's had a horrible accident rate, but nonetheless, went on to become safer and more dependable.

Count me in the "this ain't gonna kill Maglev" contingent. One major accident in 30 years isn't a bad thing (yes, I know, it's only a test track and train, but still...).

Just remember, even though roughly 1,500 people perished aboard the RMS Titanic, the disaster brought about changes in Naval Architecture, changing of international maratine law in regards to carrying enough lifeboats for all passengers aboard, an "iceberg watch" to patrol the north Atlantic... Think of all the stringent fire codes that were enacted following the "Great Chicago Fire" of 1871 that were soon adopted on a national (international?) level.

I feel that what the original designers and proponents meant by Maglev being "accident proof" was in terms of derailments and collisions. I don't recall any mention of colliding with "foreign" obstructions in any discussion of Maglevs that I've heard/read. This incident (or accident, however you want to look at it) will lead to questions about how to deal with objects, other than Maglev trains, on (or within close proximity to) the guideway and how they will affect trains operating on the lines. It has also been mentioned that this was a case of "human error," and that the crew in the operations center was aware of the work platform being on the track, maybe this will improve safety protocols on that level too.

If anything, this will make Maglev safer by raising questions about safety issues that may not have been previously considered and/or addressed and finding solutions to them.

Emsland disaster shatters maglev dream
Railway Gazette International
01 October 2006

ON THE MORNING of September 22 the three-section TR08 Transrapid maglev
vehicle collided at around 180 km/h with a guideway mainte-nance vehicle at
the Emsland test facility near Lathen in north Germany. Altogether 23 people
were killed and 10 injured, some of them seriously - early reports indicated
that 31 people were on board and that two staff were at work on the
maintenance vehicle.

While the accident does not call into question the technical principle of
magnetic levitation, it raises fundamental issues about Transrapid's
operational practicalities and safety measures. Conventional railways are by
no means immune from accidents, but operations at the 31·5 km Emsland test
guideway appear to have relied on primitive safety procedures.

The calamity apparently happened because the operator in the control centre
was unaware that the rubber-tyred maintenance vehicle was out on the
elevated guideway. Reports suggested that control centre staff were required
to make a simple visual check that the diesel-powered maintenance vehicle
was safely in its berth near the control centre before authorising a test
run with the maglev vehicle, there being no back-up system or device to
indicate the maintenance vehicle's location - although this basic safety
weakness has been rectified on China's 31 km Transrapid line which has been
carrying fare-paying passengers between Pudong and Shanghai Airport since
January 2004.

On September 23 Osnabrück public prosecutor Alexander Retemeyer indicated
that human error was likely to be the cause of the collision, commenting
that 'we must assume there were relatively few technical safety measures'.

That the vehicle was apparently out clearing twigs and branches from the
guideway surface highlights the vulnerability of maglev to any obstacle. As
the Transrapid designers were confident that a collision between maglev
vehicles was impossible, the amount of structural strength in the
passenger-carrying vehicles is minimal, offering the passengers on September
22 - who are understood to have included relatives of staff who worked at
the test facility - almost no protection.

The almost complete destruction of the leading section of TR08 underlines
the point. Clearly, any attempt to enhance the crashworthiness of a maglev
vehicle would make it heavier, forcing a redesign with more powerful magnets
to generate a greater lifting force. This would consume more energy, to say
nothing of adding cost.

Ironically, on the day of the accident German Transport Minister Wolfgang
Tiefensee was on a five-day trip to China that was to have included
negotiations about a 170 km extension of the Shanghai maglev route to
Hangzhou (RG 7.06 p384). He was told about the disaster by Chinese Minister
of Railways Liu Zhijun and decided to cut short his visit and return to
Germany to inspect the scene of the disaster Chancellor Angela Merkel also
visited the site.

On September 24 Tiefensee attended an emergency meeting in Berlin with the
Transrapid consortium members, Thyssen-Krupp and Siemens, IABG, the
operating company of the Lathen test facility, and Erwin Huber, Transport
Minister for the Land of Bayern who has been keen to see a maglev line built
between München and the city's airport. Tiefensee ordered a full inquiry
into the cause of the disaster and cautioned against drawing conclusions
about the future of maglev from the crash.

However, the collision comes in the wake of an unexplained fire on one of
the five-section vehicles in Shanghai on August 11. Although no one was
hurt, the fire had already fuelled concerns about the safety of maglev
operations.

The crash in the birthplace of Transrapid technology has now shattered the
consortium's cherished image of maglev as the inter-city transport of the
future, and plans to build the maglev airport link in München will
inevitably be put on hold.

With previous attempts to build a maglev route in Germany failing to bear
fruit, the promoters have been funding residual development work to the tune
of around k60m a year, but had already been reported as planning to cut back
their expenditure if no commercial contract were signed by the end of this
year. It is difficult to see how Transrapid can recover.

as freely translated from Dutch article:
http://www.dvhn.nl/nieuws/groningen/art ... -in-Lathen

LATHEN its the end for the maglev track in Lathen Germany just across the Dutch border. the test center will close before end of this year.

60 employees will lose their jobs. The German government will no longer invest in Maglev technology. 1.5 billion Euro's in tax money had been used for the project. the Goverment will spend another 40 million euro for demolision of test track.

The test track in Lahen had been used since 1984 for experimental transrapid train

In Lathen werd sinds 1984 geëxperimenteerd met de Transrapidtrein

more in English here:
http://canvmaglevnews.blogspot.com/2010 ... rapid.html

DutchRailnut wrote:The German government will no longer invest in Maglev technology.

Technically its Siemens and ThyssenKrupp that killed it by no longer ordering test series there (since 2009), since both consider the technology mature enough for the market. The test track has basically been sitting around doing nothing in the past few years, so the government is cutting its annual funding of lately about €6 million. Development funding for the technology was already cut in 2008.

Due to certain contract clauses (under-use) it's actually likely that Siemens and Thyssenkrupp end up paying up to twice the sum required for disassembly, meaning they'll be covering at least the last five years of funding as well.

DutchRailnut wrote:1.5 billion Euro's in tax money had been used for the project.

€400 million to build it 1980 to 1987, since then about €18-20 million average annually for operations and testing until 2008... the remaining 800 million went into general maglev development projects, not into this particular project.

Now that Germany has thrown in the towel for its Transrapid system, what will happen to the Shanghai airport system? That's the only user of that technology, and if its maintainers start running out of spare parts, they may eventually decide to shut it down. Something like what happened to the Birmingham, UK airport maglev.

However, Japan's maglev system uses a different technology, so I don't think that it will be affected.

Siemens and ThyssenKrupp, the ones marketing the system, are still trying to sell it, and they of course will continue to provide spare parts etc.

There just isn't any state-sponsored development work on the concept being done any more, since the technology is considered mature and no longer in need of this.

After the crash at Emsland test facility there really seems no interest in the system anymore.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/09/22 ... lev_crash/