Hypothesis: "Thanks, But No Thanks"

What would be the state of the intercity passenger train today had the roads after enactment of RPSA70 simply said "thanks but no thanks; we are not joining the NRPC (Amtrak) and we know that, under the Act, we must run them for at least another five years", or until 1976.

The Late Randy Resor (Nellie Bly around here), who had a career in both private sector consulting and with the FRA, said, both at posts and to me face to face, that there wouldn't be a one left away from the Corridor. I hold to my often stated view that RPSA70 and Amtrak represented "the Faustian pact with the Devil".

In any discussion, let us not forget that under the Staggers Act, when implemented during 1980, "sunsetted" the ICC and deregulated the railroad industry with regards to rates and service, except in cases of discrimination.

Good question. I agree that most of the non-corridor passenger trains would have disappeared, but how would the Class One roads have fared without the necessity of running passenger trains in the late 70s? The 1970s were not a great era for the railroad industry as a whole and there wasn't much visionary thinking going on at that time. Would the industry have deteriorated into a dilapidated network of rusty rails and splintered crossties slowly sinking into the mud? Would there have been more mergers of failing lines struggling to serve coal and wheat trains at 25 mph max? There are lots of ways that the industry could have (d)evolved.

Might there have been a few Brightlines a little bit sooner in higher density corridors? Probably not but maybe...

France was designing and building its TGV network during the 1970s. Maybe an enterprising American entrepreneur might have seen the possibility of scooping up some cheap ROW and building some high-speed passenger rail lines. Imagine if Bill Gates had been fascinated with Lionels during his childhood.

Vincent wrote: ↑Sun Jul 17, 2022 11:29 am Would the industry have deteriorated into a dilapidated network of rusty rails and splintered crossties slowly sinking into the mud?

Sounds like "my MILW's" Lines West at "The End".

That, Mr. Vincent, is indeed an interesting point. If in the absence of the contractual provision "to maintain...to the same degree of utility" (language within the May 1, 1971 Operating Agreement of which I still have a copy "somewhere") would have the roads allowed their plant to deteriorate to such extent that JBH, UPS, FDX just stayed on the highways?

In which case, the argument that Amtrak forced the roads to maintain the plant so that when DEREG came about and these carriers seeking a means "in the league as fast" yet at considerably lower rates found that the roads were there and Amtrak actually benefitted them in attracting this high value traffic.

Wow, wonder why the advocacy community hasn't picked up on that one.

I think we would have seen a nationalization of the industry far beyond what Conrail became.

Let's remember that both Southern and Rio Grande indeed said "thanks but no thanks" in '70-'71.

It is interesting to me that both ultimately DID join Amtrak close to, or after the 5 year mark, when Staggers deregulation was clearly imminent or already implemented. Why did they make this choice when the conventional wisdom around here is that private railroads want nothing to do with hosting Amtrak?

I certainly agree, Mr. Rohr, that both "fly in the face" of Randy's, as well as mine, position.

Now, we must remember that BOTH the DRGW and SRY had accomplished much "whacking" between the CY 1969 entry fee measuring period and RPSA enactment. The DRGW got the Zephyr down to tri-weekly early '70, and the SRY had success with their "nowhere to nowhere" intrastate strategy of dealing with the State regulatory agencies, which apparently "they owned". So in both cases, the "bang for the buck" would be less when compared with roads who were still running what they did through '69.

Further, the DRGW had in place during '70 a "fast and frequent" strategy, and the Tri-Weekly Zephyr frequency represented less interference. However, when during '83 they signed up, they had reverted to the usual "run 'em long; makes the GTMTH - Gross Ton Miler per Train Hour - measurement look better. As a result, Amtrak's requirement for Daily service represented less burden on their plant.

To what extent that WGC was "at the Amtrak throttle" when SRY signed up was an influence, I know not.

Note that Southern joined Amtrak in 1979 though Graham Claytor didn't become president of Amtrak until 1982. Perhaps backroom discussions were already in the works?

Two other carriers, Santa Fe and Seaboard Coast Line may have continued if they were allowed to shed some lesser patronized trains. SCL would have been permitted to drop the Gulf Coast Special and the Everglades as well as the Palmland. Santa Fe could have been allowed to cut one or two and keep the Super Chief/El Capitan and Texas Chief. Keep in mind that Auto Train started at this time as well. Another interesting tidbit I recall hearing is at his retirement ceremony, W. Thomas Rice indicated that SCL was essentially blackmailed into joining Amtrak.

Yes Mr. Mayes, that is what I learned as well.

SCL had passenger trains that were putting more into the cookie jar (my favorite phrase to describe household accounting when I was in practice) than they were taking out, as a result, SCL could have made the case to stay out and be $$$ ahead for so doing. They had relatively new equipment (<15yo) inherited from the SAL and much goodwill from their trains.

But they only owned one third of the RF&P (PRR, B&O, SAL, ACL, C&O, and holding company R-W Co being the original owners) - and RF&P was signing up. That put the SCL in the position that their connection at Richmond could be broken - and having to roust passengers - especially Sleeper for a "change at Richmond" not exactly conducive.

So SCL signed up.

I don't think the RF@P situation would not necessarily have been a game changer since Auto Train started near the same time. SCL simply would have been "grandfathered" in.

Mr. Mayes, the SCL and RF&P entered into their own operating agreement with the Auto Train Corp. While such is bilateral resulting in the provisions of such being privileged, it is not the same operating agreement CSX and Amtrak have with one another covering the operation of other trains. That Auto Train agreement remains separate to this day.

The only question to my mind is if there were any RR's with healthy balance sheets that could hold on for the 5 years. Roads like the Wabash or L&N busy getting absorbed in mergers with larger systems. Maybe a Kansas City St Louis Detroit train with no interstate could have held on for a while. Service provided by old E's & FP's pulling old equipment. Would there have been any loans to rebuild for HEP & other items. Anything to reduce operating costs.

Second to this is not having deregulation of airlines & the beginning short haul airline service. A $35 fare for maybe an hour in the air. People now forget how expensive air travel was. No RR could compete with this short haul service. Southwest is an example of these new airlines.

For the Milwaukee Road could they continue to run 1x a day Chicago-St Paul with nothing beyond that. Maybe more service Chicago Milwaukee. On poor track OTP suffers and service gets worse. It would show up to cut cost with poor maintenance, dirty cars, slow travel times.

Gilbert B Norman wrote: ↑Mon Jul 18, 2022 11:20 am
SCL had passenger trains that were putting more into the cookie jar (my favorite phrase to describe household accounting when I was in practice) than they were taking out, as a result, SCL could have made the case to stay out and be $$$ ahead for so doing. They had relatively new equipment (<15yo) inherited from the SAL and much goodwill from their trains.

One footnote to that: An acquaintance who was a passenger rep on SCL and transferred to freight post-Amtrak told me that SCL experienced a cash-flow crunch in the fall of 1971 arising from one fundamental difference between passenger and freight: passengers pay up front while freight shippers mostly pay after the movement is completed -- sometimes quite a while after. SCL had been accustomed to a strong influx of revenue from passengers willing to pay around October or November to secure precious sleeping-car space from New York to Florida in December; that revenue now went directly to Amtrak, and the financial people were scrambling for cash to fill the gap.