The St. Vincent Hospital tunnel in Worcester was built under contemporary requirements for new and re-built railroad overhead structures, so it is fully cleared. The relatively modern tunnel to the north under Lincoln Square is restricted to 19'6".
In search of the forest for the trees, as 2022 approaches, and with a nod to a couple of riffs from the Broadway musical Hamilton, my continued take on CSX's acquisition of PAR/.5 PAS is that without being "in the room where it happens", "we don't know what we don't know".
It's only the first inning of a game that will be played over at least 10 years. CSX had to buy 3 easily separate and distinct sections of the railroad lock, stock, and barrel. There's as much indication that this strategic move is defensive as it is offensive, ie., as much to keep a 3rd Class 1 out of Boston, et. al and make way for passenger rail and transit-oriented growth, as it is to become the 3rd Class 1 in Saint John, et. al.
Absent protecting their existing franchise from the Canadians and by accommodating re-structuring in the face of strategic pressure on freight rail infrastructure, the benefits of CSX's move at a cost exceeding a "bargain" have limitation as marginal (ie., only the net difference of handling traffic alternatively over existing gateways, ports, or lanes) as long as CSX maintained a friendly connection post-Mellon; short-haul; and otherwise necessarily requiring CSX ownership &/or operation of the entire railroad unclear.
Additionally, CSX must play within the larger economic rules of railroading and the New England transportation market when it comes to ports, premium service markets and everything in between no matter what they bring to the table.. And, from my own experience, I take with a grain of salt the public communication around this, which to date has had some measure of mixed messaging,. Lastly, it would not be out of the range of "post-PSR" behavior for CSX to take control of this generational opportunity to invest in, possibly hedge, and ultimately re-structure, including possible line sales/leasing, to create their best strategic position within New England's rail network.
A couple of recent cautionary telltales from this thread about the nature of CSX's play include discussion of the prospects around CN in that unless CSX cooperatively works with CN and can accomplish wholesale effective changes as to how they interchange on the eastern sides of their networks, cherry-picking traffic simply reduces traffic on an alternate existing agreed-upon gateway with marginal results, or, if done aggressively, also risks a CN response with broader implications. The reported rumor of CSX/MBTA talks, as another example, would likely be in the context of solutions to on-going Boston metropolitan, passenger rail, and transit-oriented development growth strategic pressure. In this particular case I'd put my money on Readville for Lowell yard horse trading to ultimately meet the "next up in line" re-development pressure and accommodate traffic, similar in value to CSX's PAR Maine forest products market, moved over to new, existing and/or re-purposed Lowell Line corridor facilities. GFI's proposed Wilmington Woburn Intermodal/New England Transrail project and concept, for example, would be just the kind of ticket for CSX to use the "north side" to move, consolidate and keep control of valuable "south side" traffic.
So, while I'm certainly finding the game important and chatter surrounding it interesting and entertaining, at such an early point in the game with mixed scouting on the fundamentals, I think best not to get too far ahead and let the game unfold instead. While I won't yet completely exclude many possibilities, only time will tell of CSX's root motivation and its influence on their behavior and the long-term outcome, including the mix of offense v. defense; growth v. retention/re-structuring; and, north vs. south of Portland including B&A v. PAS.