Damn! What a catastrophe. The engineer later died from his wounds.
Amazingly, I saw that same Webshots gallery on the web at least a year ago. I could have sworn the URL was posted right here. Like all good things, it went down with the ship when rr.net had yet another digital earthquake without the website content backed-up. Haven't seen those pix again 'til today.
It's sickening to see what can happen when grade-crossing protection fails. The Southhampton wreck was an extreme example. The day before was New Year's Day 1982, when no service ran. The first revenue RDC trip to run north the next day was not enough to scour all of the rust from the railheads. This very thin rust layer -- something that may or may not have been visible from the cab -- was just enough to partially insulate the rails, interfering with the signal current. Didn't the engineer suspect this might happen? Didn't the dispatcher warn him? Wasn't there a bulletin order issued, to be on guard that morning?
The reason might be because the Newtown service was then in the hands of the bizarre "Fox Chase Rapid Transit Line" experiment created by SEPTA. A presumed lack of fully FRA-compliant maintenance & operating practices may have been a contributing cause to this tragedy. That's my personal conjecture as a "civilian" observer. One of the objections at the time was that taking the Newtown branch operation from career railroaders and giving it to retrained personnel recently transferred from the Broad St. Subway was begging for trouble.
Bear in mind that back then, SEPTA was in more of a fiscal crisis in 1981 than in 2005.
The entire diesel service to Bound Brook & Newark, Newtown, Bethlehem, and Pottsville had just been killed as part of a desperate campaign to keep out-of-control costs from destroying the entire system. The FCRTL began service in October. This cost-saving move sure looked nice on paper. I think one of the reasons it was so much cheaper was that oversight may have been allowed to get very thin. Did the SEPTA managers who created this idea later "walk the plank" after the Southhampton wreck?
SEPTA RDC #9164 was
not one of the RDCs which were safe to operate at full track speed over crossings as a single-car train. It lacked the additional electronic axle shunts which insured that gates & flashers would trip correctly. 9164 should have been operated only as part of a two-car train that morning. Doubling the number of axles in order to shine the rails would have made a big difference.
Reading Company operating practice was that a single-car RDC train had to slow down in advance for any grade xing until it was observed that the car had entered the circuit and that gates & flashers had definitely activated. The special RDCs were the only ones that were allowed to come by at full track speed, as the additional hardware gave them a major advantage. Reading had only two cars so equipped, as most of their late-era diesel passenger schedules called for consists of at least two cars.
One of those two RDCs should have been assigned that run, given the prevailing conditions. A non-equipped car should never have been sent out as the first train to Newtown after no service in 24 hours, plus having rained most of the previous day as well. Thus, 9164 was virtually guaranteed some degree of trouble. RMS Titanic, meet the iceberg...
Franklin Gowen • • • • READING COMPANY forum moderator
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