Major derailment @ Spuyten Duyvil

DutchRailnut wrote:they came via service road next hudson river.
yes one fatality in cab-car

as for alerters , m-1a, m-3a, acmu, cab cars, GP35's, FL-9's etc etc have moved tru the site of crash for 30 years of Metro North at about 200 moves per day.
so now all of sudden its issue ???

Not to mention the 100 years before Metro North.

Still, it makes no sense to me to have a higher level of protection (alerter) in the locomotive versus the cab car (deadman pedal).

Ken W2KB wrote:

Dieter wrote:The Union now has the fodder to make a case to reinstate a second person in the cab of a train. I'm sure a lot of operators at this stage would prefer to work alone but in the interest of "Safety First", as we have seen all too often, anything can happen.

An aircraft with anything from a handful of people to well over 200 passengers has two trained and licensed operators in the cockpit. It seems that trains carrying up to 1000 people should have the same safeguard.

Aircraft are far more complex by orders of magnitude in systems, operation, emergency actions, navigation, weather effects and so forth. In my opinion the comparison is not appropriate. Airline aircraft also have annunciators and alarm systems to alert to the crew to issues. That is a fair comparison, and improvements to such, i.e., PTC as the goal with interim measures implemented as soon as practicable.

Both aircraft pilots and rail engineers do share the same susceptibility of dozing during periods when there is little to do.

Aircraft are more complex but in some respects more foregiving - you can make a lot of mistakes and not bend metal.
What I find interesting is that MN considers a second person to be a distraction while in airplanes, the second pilot is "essential". Of course, if the second person in the cab is mostly along for the ride, he probably is a distraction. But enforce cab discipline and designated roles, it becomes a different matter.
On a plane, both pilots have a designated role: one is Pilot Flying (PF) and one is Pilot Not Flying (PNF). They generally switch every flight. PNF normally handles the radio and other duties not involving manipulating the controls. Of course if needed, one can do it all but barring emergency, that's only in cruise (lav breaks, meals, etc.). During critical stages of flight (ground ops unless stopped and in non-cruise flight below 10,000 feet*), there's a sterile cockpit discipline with no unessential converstation.
So how do you do similar with a railroad? Have an Engineer Running (ER) and an Engineer Not Running (ENR) with defined roles and trading off between runs (no I'm the engineer, you're the fireman). Make the ENR responsible for radio, calling signals (ENR calls, ER responds), calling out speed restrictions a suitable distance in advance (like a PNF calling an altitude restriction as it's approached). And enforce a "sterile cab" discipline (I'd argue unless the train is stopped, it's a critical phase of operation and sterile cab should be in effect - there's no railroad equivalent to an airplane in the cruise phase of flight).
FWIW, I work for an airline in an operational role and am also a light plane pilot.
* Non-cruise flight below 10,000 for an airliner? Yes, it happens on rare occasions. Usually short flights with a pressurization issue. I was once on a 737 that flew Cincinnati to Chicago at 6,000 feet due such an issue and weather that made anything 8,000 and 10,000 undesirable.

Clean Cab wrote:

scoostraw wrote:That curve at Spuyten Duyvil has been there for what - 160 years or so?

Has anything like this ever happened there before this?

I believe there was a similar crash at or near the same location sometime in the early 1900's. You might want to post this on the NY Central page.

There was a wreck there in January 1882 that killed Webster Wagner, a Vanderbilt in-law and early competitor of Pullman in the sleeping-car business-- but that was a collision caused when a local from Tarrytown came around the curve at speed and smashed into the rear of a stalled train. Here's a contemporary account:

http://www.catskillarchive.com/rrextra/wksdfl.Html

As for outlying loops, Danbury, Conn. should have one. New Haven's faces away from New York, I'm not sure which way Croton - Harmon's faced, or if it's still there.
Could some of the delay getting partial service back up been because of the heavy equipment crossing the track that wasn't damaged by the derailment?

lstone19 wrote:

Ken W2KB wrote:

Dieter wrote:The Union now has the fodder to make a case to reinstate a second person in the cab of a train. I'm sure a lot of operators at this stage would prefer to work alone but in the interest of "Safety First", as we have seen all too often, anything can happen.

An aircraft with anything from a handful of people to well over 200 passengers has two trained and licensed operators in the cockpit. It seems that trains carrying up to 1000 people should have the same safeguard.

Aircraft are far more complex by orders of magnitude in systems, operation, emergency actions, navigation, weather effects and so forth. In my opinion the comparison is not appropriate. Airline aircraft also have annunciators and alarm systems to alert to the crew to issues. That is a fair comparison, and improvements to such, i.e., PTC as the goal with interim measures implemented as soon as practicable.

Both aircraft pilots and rail engineers do share the same susceptibility of dozing during periods when there is little to do.

Aircraft are more complex but in some respects more foregiving - you can make a lot of mistakes and not bend metal.
What I find interesting is that MN considers a second person to be a distraction while in airplanes, the second pilot is "essential". Of course, if the second person in the cab is mostly along for the ride, he probably is a distraction. But enforce cab discipline and designated roles, it becomes a different matter.
On a plane, both pilots have a designated role: one is Pilot Flying (PF) and one is Pilot Not Flying (PNF). They generally switch every flight. PNF normally handles the radio and other duties not involving manipulating the controls. Of course if needed, one can do it all but barring emergency, that's only in cruise (lav breaks, meals, etc.). During critical stages of flight (ground ops unless stopped and in non-cruise flight below 10,000 feet*), there's a sterile cockpit discipline with no unessential converstation.
So how do you do similar with a railroad? Have an Engineer Running (ER) and an Engineer Not Running (ENR) with defined roles and trading off between runs (no I'm the engineer, you're the fireman). Make the ENR responsible for radio, calling signals (ENR calls, ER responds), calling out speed restrictions a suitable distance in advance (like a PNF calling an altitude restriction as it's approached). And enforce a "sterile cab" discipline (I'd argue unless the train is stopped, it's a critical phase of operation and sterile cab should be in effect - there's no railroad equivalent to an airplane in the cruise phase of flight).
FWIW, I work for an airline in an operational role and am also a light plane pilot.
* Non-cruise flight below 10,000 for an airliner? Yes, it happens on rare occasions. Usually short flights with a pressurization issue. I was once on a 737 that flew Cincinnati to Chicago at 6,000 feet due such an issue and weather that made anything 8,000 and 10,000 undesirable.

One possibility that I can see until it is automated, is that unlike the aircraft where both pilots must be fully qualified to operate, in the case of the "safety person" in a train cab, the person could merely be qualified on the physical characteristics and relevant rules/signal aspects to the extent necessary and who could refer to documentation as needed during the trip - which is considerably less skilled than the engineer. The lower pay grade would save money while providing the requisite safety improvement. The "safety person" would have a leg up if they wanted to eventually become an engineer.

737 at 6,000 feet must have been interesting for the passengers including flying no faster than 250 knots!

Another fact involving PTC that has not been mentioned here -- in fact is rarely mentioned anywhere -- is that the equipment is not yet available. If you read the MTA Committee reports every month senior management has been complaining for over a year that the vendor is way behind on providing a tested and reliable system.

Another comment I see is, that the FRA keeps pushing the carriers to implement this system when they need to be pushing the vendor(s).

I think it was LIRR's Helena Williams who made the point that, the major reason the carriers were not able to attain some of the deadlines was, "If it doesn't exist we can't buy and install it."

DutchRailnut wrote:they came via service road next hudson river.
yes one fatality in cab-car

as for alerters , m-1a, m-3a, acmu, cab cars, GP35's, FL-9's etc etc have moved tru the site of crash for 30 years of Metro North at about 200 moves per day.
so now all of sudden its issue ???

It is debatable if an alerter would have prevented this accident.

Besides that a deadman pedal should prevent an accident caused by an engineer falling asleep. one problem with an alerter is that if it doesn't kick in immediately, then there can be a critical, even fatal, window of opportunity for damage to occur. IIRC, it takes at least 30 - 60 seconds for an alerter system to make a train stop.

railfan365 wrote:Besides that a deadman pedal should prevent an accident caused by an engineer falling asleep.

Maybe if he physically falls out of the seat and onto the floor. Otherwise probably not, actually.

Ever start to nod off while driving a car? Did your foot lift off of the gas pedal?

JimBoylan wrote: I'm not sure which way Croton - Harmon's faced, or if it's still there.

As far Hudson and Harlem Line yards with loops:

Croton-Harmon - none
Poughkeepise - none
High Bridge - none
North While Plains -none
Wassaic - none
Brewster - none, has wye

railfan365 wrote:Besides that a deadman pedal should prevent an accident caused by an engineer falling asleep. one problem with an alerter is that if it doesn't kick in immediately, then there can be a critical, even fatal, window of opportunity for damage to occur. IIRC, it takes at least 30 - 60 seconds for an alerter system to make a train stop.

If you are tall or long legged the dead man pedal would not necessarily spring up if a engineer fell asleep momentarily. Besides there is no evidence that this engineer fell asleep. He may have been in a conscious daze which happens to people driving cars all the time. You're not fully awake, but you're not fully asleep either. We will know when the NTSB makes it's report public.

Clean Cab wrote:It is debatable if an alerter would have prevented this accident.

Yes it is debatable. But there is a decent chance it would have prevented it.

In any case, how can Metro North defend not having alerters in cab cars?

with media quoting snozing, let it be known the engineer told investigators he zoned out, he did not say he was sleeping.
zoning out can be anything from having your thoughts on other than what your doing to having a brain fart.
ever watch someone do something, next it seems like he pauses for minute or so ??

scoostraw wrote:

Clean Cab wrote:It is debatable if an alerter would have prevented this accident.

Yes it is debatable. But there is a decent chance it would have prevented it.

In any case, how can Metro North defend not having alerters in cab cars?

again there is plenty of trains with no alerters, M-3a's , NJT's arrows, GP35's
alerters don't guarantee a thing, timing is as much as 30 seconds apart, the speed just before crash was 110 feet per second.

scoostraw wrote:

Clean Cab wrote:It is debatable if an alerter would have prevented this accident.

Yes it is debatable. But there is a decent chance it would have prevented it.

In any case, how can Metro North defend not having alerters in cab cars?

I do not agree. A sleepy engineer could be alert enough to acknowledge an alerter system, yet still not reduce the speed of their train. Yes, an alerter and the dead man could have worked, but we will never know for sure. It is not a matter of MN "defending" it's use of a dead man pedal versus an alerter. This was never an issue until this incident happened. There is no FRA or NTSB requirement specifying alerters over dead man pedals. Much like the Titainc met all the regulations when it was built, yet still sunk. The regulations were out of date.