by Gilbert B Norman
Mike, it appears you asked a "two parter".
First, the Lakeland-Naples "Doodlebug" lasted until A-Day; here's a photo (the photographer I've met "along the way'):
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPi ... id=2105449
Now, second, regarding the statement of SCL passenger service as a whole. I've learned that SCL darned near stayed out. The lights burned late at 500 Water in the days leading up to A-Day and that then-SCL CEO Prime Osborn was personally involved in the decision process.
On A-Day eve, or so what I learned, is that SCL was making an avoidable cost (out of pocket; whatever) profit on their passenger operations, but when they considered that Amtrak could break the interchange at Wash and adversely affect the business, they had best factor that in. Even worse would have been if RF&P stayed out, then how would a rousting of passengers at Richmond go down? What if the connecting Amtrak train at Richmond was "uh, not so convenient'.
Also, even though the SAL had placed new equipment in service as late as 1956 (15 years old on A-Day), it would eventually have to be replaced. All told, it was best to sign up - and so they did.
Of course, many here have contended that Amtrak failed, or simply chose not, to recognize that they had a "unique" long distance East Coast market in which the business had simply not dried up, but of course, whoever heard of JetBlue and/or a deregulated air transport industry back then?
First, the Lakeland-Naples "Doodlebug" lasted until A-Day; here's a photo (the photographer I've met "along the way'):
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPi ... id=2105449
Now, second, regarding the statement of SCL passenger service as a whole. I've learned that SCL darned near stayed out. The lights burned late at 500 Water in the days leading up to A-Day and that then-SCL CEO Prime Osborn was personally involved in the decision process.
On A-Day eve, or so what I learned, is that SCL was making an avoidable cost (out of pocket; whatever) profit on their passenger operations, but when they considered that Amtrak could break the interchange at Wash and adversely affect the business, they had best factor that in. Even worse would have been if RF&P stayed out, then how would a rousting of passengers at Richmond go down? What if the connecting Amtrak train at Richmond was "uh, not so convenient'.
Also, even though the SAL had placed new equipment in service as late as 1956 (15 years old on A-Day), it would eventually have to be replaced. All told, it was best to sign up - and so they did.
Of course, many here have contended that Amtrak failed, or simply chose not, to recognize that they had a "unique" long distance East Coast market in which the business had simply not dried up, but of course, whoever heard of JetBlue and/or a deregulated air transport industry back then?