Sand Patch derailment 02/05/10

fizzlejibs wrote:Granted some cars may have been crappy NYC cars that ALWAYS have bad brakes.

Some pics I saw of the cars piled up showed 820000 series hoppers and some 48000 series hoppers that were lettered "NYC."

Here's an excerpt from the report at http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01765:

He stated that the last time he conditioned his brakes was before Garrett at MP 219.5, by making a minimum brake pipe reduction and then went to at least 10 psi or greater before releasing the application after Yoder, MP 218.4. This was approximately 8 miles before the train stopped, using air and locomotive dynamic brakes, when the crew removed the helper locomotives at the tunnel on the top of Sandpatch grade. The helper crew then restored the End of Train Device (EOTD) on the rear of train U883-03.
The EOTD air pressure was about 76 psi when the train began its descent on Main Track number two. The engineer applied minimum power to get the train moving. The engineer then went to locomotive dynamic brake, eventually going to full dynamic brake. After reaching a speed of about 19 mph the engineer began applying the automatic train brakes while remaining in full locomotive dynamic brake. Realizing his speed was not decreasing, the engineer made a full service brake application at a speed of about 30 mph, and held it for about a minute. When the speed of the train increased to about 32 mph, the engineer placed the train in
emergency, which initiated an emergency application from the head end and the EOTD at the rear of the train simultaneously. The lead locomotive, CSX 565, has a feature in the brake software which initiates an emergency application at the EOTD when the train is placed in emergency via the automatic brake valve handle.
The train continued to gain speed for about 6 miles on the descending average grade of 1.47 percent. At the time the derailment occurred the recorded train speed was 65 mph. The derailment occurred at mile post 201.4 at 2:15 a.m. on February 6, 2010. The locomotives did not derail. The first 108 cars did derail and were piled up in an area of about 1,000 feet. The remaining 22 cars did not derail and remained upright and in line. FRA safety inspectors did not arrive at the derailment site until Monday, February 8, 2010. This was due to nearly impassable roads in the area of the derailment because of the 24-30 inches of snow. When FRA inspectors arrived at the derailment site, the derailed coal cars were piled up along the right of way. This work was done by RJ Corman and Hulcher Corp. both of which are derailment cleanup companies. They were in the process of restoring both main tracks and the right of way.
Main Track number two was back in service on February 9, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.

Why didn't the inspectors get a ride with the clean up contractors?

Thanks for posting the link to the FRA report. I had forgotten all about this although at the time it happened I followed it closely.

How does the FRA explain the train running away the way it did? Ice build up on the wheels and brake assemblies?

Guess I have to read the report.

Edited to add - I changed "NTSB" to "FRA" as this is an FRA report, not an NTSB report as I first thought.

I wondered if the train's air brakes had been sufficiently charged after being used at the stop to remove the helper engine. Is there a standard for brake pipe pressure on that hill?

Jim did you read the the FRA report you linked because it doesn't list inadequate brake line pressure as a cause. It says the EOT device recorded brake pressure at 76 psi when the train began its descent down Sand Patch.

The FRA conclusion is the train got away due to a combination of excessive speed and the build-up of ice and snow between wheels and brake shoes. The extreme weather conditions are also listed as a contributing factor.

The FRA faults the locomotive engineer for not "conditioning the brakes" more frequently in order to keep the wheels and brake assemblies free of ice and snow.

Without going back through the thread, I think that was the conclusion most of the locomotive engineers posting here came to. The FRA notes that CSX does not agree with the FRA's assessment.

I didn't see a specific statement that the brake pipe pressure cited at the End Of Train was sufficient for CSX rules for that train and grade. There was discussion in the report about dynamic brake requirements.

If the train line air pressure was inadequate when the train started down the grade I would certainly expect FRA would list that as a contributing factor.

Tommy Meehan wrote:...The FRA report...says the EOT device recorded brake pressure at 76 psi when the train began its descent down Sand Patch...

According to a CSX ETT issued in 2000 for the Cumberland Division, on page seven

AIR BRAKE INSTRUCTIONS FOR DESCENDING SANDPATCH
(a). Brake Pipe Pressure
The Brake Pipe Pressure on the rear of eastward loaded trains must be 70 lbs. or higher prior to passing over summit at Sand Patch.

Link to ETT

Youd think they wiuldnt have any selling mistakes in a government report. I saw it, can anyone else find it?

beanbag wrote:Youd think they wiuldnt have any selling mistakes in a government report...

Did you mean "spelling" mistakes?

Tommy Meehan wrote:

beanbag wrote:Youd think they wiuldnt have any selling mistakes in a government report...

Did you mean "spelling" mistakes?

HA! Nice catch Tommy! Yes I did.. I banged that last post out quickly on my iPad and I dont have the spellchecker set on that device. No but in all seriousness in the report there is a SPELLING ( ) mistake.