Oschersleben, near Magdeburg, head-on crash

Various news reports tell of a head-on crash on single track, a HarzElbeExpress colliding against a goods train carrying chalk. Link is here:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/ger ... 28,00.html
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It seems as if each train was owned by a private firm, the HEX owned by Veolia, the freight owned by Peine-Salzgitter. Would that mean that the drivers were employees of the private firm?
Any other comments on this tragic crash?
Thanks.
Joe McMahon

bellstbarn wrote:Various news reports tell of a head-on crash on single track, a HarzElbeExpress colliding against a goods train carrying chalk. Link is here:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/ger ... 28,00.html
----
It seems as if each train was owned by a private firm, the HEX owned by Veolia, the freight owned by Peine-Salzgitter. Would that mean that the drivers were employees of the private firm?
Any other comments on this tragic crash?
Thanks.
Joe McMahon

BBC reports it is a single-track line. That implies that it was a signalling problem. I believe signalling is controlled by the track authority.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12082035

It was a head-on crash.
As the pictures show, the train was almost catapulted off the tracks, destroying the front half of the train completely and throwing it on the side. The locomotive of the freight-train (double headed) suffered almost no damage on the buffers, but the front engine housing with the motor was sheared off. This fits together with some pictures, showing the roof of the front of the HEX train relatively undamaged, but all below disappeared.. The freight-train with its locos stayed completely on the track. As investigations report so far, it seems that the driver of the freight-train ignored at least two stop signals. As this line has a speed limit of 100km/h, no INDUSI is required, although it CAN be installed on other lines. Reports say, the dispatcher noticed the failure of the freight-train and sent out an emergency signal, causing the HEX-driver to slow down, but it was too late.
One one picture you see the end of the freight-train on the single track, short after the switch for the two-track section, with the semaphore-signal for the HEX (coming from the opposite direction) still on "Go". This shows that there was a train where none should be...

With the passenger train doing 120 km/h and the freight 80 km/h and with 50 people in the passenger train, there is no design that protects agianst the forces during impact, the "g" forces allone are lethal and then the effects of debris flying everywhere in the passenger train.

There was construction work in progres on the line when the accident happened.

Gijs

Here are two pics that show the situation:
http://s7.directupload.net/images/110131/mubaoqbp.jpg

This is exactly where it happened:
The “HEX” is coming, and the entrance-signal of Hordorf shows the “proceed-aspect”.
So far, so good.
But when the accident happened, the freight-train was right there where the “HEX” should have been... it was freezing, nighttime and very foggy.

http://s1.directupload.net/images/110131/zbizxdhf.jpg
And here is the signal, which was supposedly ignored by the freight-train.
As you see, there are no INDUSI-Magnets or whatever on this signal.

Sounds awful. I cannot see the photos for some reason [probably blocked by work intranet] but I assume INDUSI, unlike our AWS in UK, is like TPWS and has a Train Stop function for overrunning red signals? I know that in light rail situations it might not be deemed so necassary. However, as mentioned, in fog, cold, bad weather situations it can obviously be useful. I guess for small companies the expense is partly why it is not necassary for lines under certain speeds?
Sad news on the death toll. I have travelled some lines in the Halberstadt area, when going to the Harz Steam lines.
ttfn

UKTowerOperator wrote:I assume INDUSI, unlike our AWS in UK, is like TPWS and has a Train Stop function for overrunning red signals?

Correct.

Indusi has three possible signals:
- warning for max 100 km/h
- warning for max 30 km/h
- enforced train stop

For the first one, train stop is enforced if the driver doesn't acknowledge/react to the signal within four seconds, and depending on system may start a countdown after which the train must have slowed to under 100 km/h.
For the second one, train stop is enforced if the train is passing at over 30 km/h.
You can pass over an enforced train stop of the third type by pressing a certain button, but this will automatically limit you to 40 km/h max and give you an audio warning (and will be entered in the train blackbox protocol).

UKTowerOperator wrote: I guess for small companies the expense is partly why it is not necassary for lines under certain speeds?

Actually, most small companies that own railway lines (physical tracks) even with less than 100 km/h speed limits use some sort of comparable train control system - not necessarily Indusi, but the law doesn't mention Indusi itself, just what it's supposed to do.
At the time the EBO law was written in 1967 (and that particular paragraph effectively hasn't been changed since then), railway operations in Germany were a lot more manpower-intensive and less automatic - and Indusi was mostly a system considered to be necessary for high-speed lines.

There are currently estimated only 500-800 km of railway lines without PZB (Indusi), almost all located in East Germany; DB since the mid-1990s has refit over 10,000 km of railway lines with PZB. In reaction to this train crash, DB has announced that it will speed up the refit of the remaining few hundred km.

I don't see any Indusi inductors in the photos that were posted. Also, as an incidental question, in the second photo the home signal governing movement to double track is not equipped to display Langsamfahrt (~diverging clear) even though the normal route would diverge onto the right-hand (in the direction of movement) track. Is that customary on lightly-trafficked lines where the only signaled route involves a divergence? (I suppose they could just put a speed restriction in the operating timetable covering movement over the switch and save a second arm and the additional linkage.)

Is that customary on lightly-trafficked lines where the only signaled route involves a divergence?

Yes, you got it.
It's clearly seen here, at 4:22 and 6:50. The passing is always on the right track, so no "direction signalling" is needed. Well, here are "automatic switches" in use.
(BTW: In two weeks the single track operation here will be closed and rebuild to a full double track section until October 2011)
Enjoy also the other parts of the "circular triangle"...

Great videos! Please keep us advised as any further information about the Oschersleben collision is reported.

Hello,

I don't see any Indusi inductors in the photos that were posted

On that Line there is no INDUSI (or corect PZB) - Equipment installed ,because the Rules don`t order that.

PZB has stopped the Train,but on the mass of the Freighttrain it still had come to a crash......


PZB is not a Jeanie in the Bottle ..........

Developed in the 1920th the Main Functions are still the same:

- 2000 Hertz Resonant Circuit = Emergency Stop (apply Breaks on Train and cuts Power off)
- 1000 Hertz Resonant Circuit = First Supervising Proceed Slow (see * )
- 500 Hertz Resonant Circuit = Final Supervising Proceed Slow (Train Speed must below 46 Km/h )


*
Levels of Supervising
O = reducing Speed of Train from Maximum under 85 Km/h in 23 seconds

M = reducing Speed of Train from 125 Km/h under 75 Km/h in 26 seconds

U = reducing Speed of Train from 105 Km/h under 55 Km/h in 34 seconds


Today the Computerprogram of the PZB do much more supervising....