Maspeth Grade Crossing Accident

The model of the crossing reflects as it was in 1950; double track main and the non-gated yard tracks. It was also build before I had access to the ETimetables and the Emery Trackmaps and so the yard tracks are not as accurate as they should be. Sorry for that but I'm not gonna' rip it up to conform to Google.

Vince, you seem to lack an understanding of what I'm stating:
When a news outlet combines one set of footage (that seems factual on it's own - the dashcam) with another (an edited clip showing a crossing gate not working yet cut not to show the flagman), it's obvious that news outlet is more interested in sensationalist soundbites than facts.

You seem to think that I am basing my point on some talking head news organizations OPINIONS of said accident.
I'm sorry DogBert, that could not be farther from the truth. I form NO conclusions from ANYTHING opined or drawn from ABC News or any other newsie for that matter.
I detest ALL of them!

There are only THREE things I am considering:
1. The Maximum allowed speed at the location. Stated as 10 MPH
2. The Crossing Rules: Train Stops. 2. Gates Lower 3. Train proceeds.
3. The independent dash-cam recording.
So let's go over what I have stated:

1. The train is OBVIOUSLY exceeding the 10 MPH speed limit.
+++ I base this on a frame-by-frame analysis of the video recording to determine the speed +++

2. The train is OBVIOUSLY NOT following the rules. again, lets go to the video tape (does Warner Wolf still say that? )
+++ This crossing has a closeup activation point that is based on a train crew following the previously described 'RULES' above. +++
As the train was obviously running at some still to be determined speed ( not stopping as required) so of course the crossing activates AFTER the train is in the crossing. Smart electronics can ALWAYS be fooled by a really stupid or asleep human being.
How can you possibly fault/blame/point-finger-at a crossing track circuit that is wired to be activated by a STOPPED train be wrong when obviously the train did IN FACT not stop as required?

3. The independent FilCo waste truck dash-cam recording.
Well! This kind of says-it-all eh?
It was not necessary or proper for you to bring up some supposed facts that FilCo was a former customer of NY&A and of "possible bad blood". You are as guilty as the news organizations when you introduced supposed 'facts' to make your point that are nothing of the sort!
That you did this puts YOU squarely with the people you are complaining about DogBert!
That's it DogBert! NOTHING else contributed to any of my statements. Just these three items I've listed.

Fortunately, I'm sure whoever is investigating this will get the source video and ignore the news outlet spin - and hopefully look at all the various problems that contributed to this accident.

That you even consider news outlet OPINIONS a part of a NTSB investigation shows you are bordering on paranoia. Let's calm down eh?

The dashcam video shows the gates did not activate until it was far, far too late - and that was certainly a contributing factor, just as much as train speed.

Baloney! This particular crossing is configured for the train to stop! How can you possibly expect a crossing designed to activate by a STOPPED train operate correctly by a train at speed?

.............. snip redundant ranting/speculation.........................

best,
vince

NYA has now said publicly to the press that the train was over the speed limit at the time of the crash. So no need to do a Zapruder film type analysis to determine it...

http://queenscourier.com/train-that-hit ... stigators/

Sources familiar with the investigation told The Courier on Tuesday that the train was moving at a minimum of 20 mph; the railroad speed limit for the area is 15 mph. Reportedly, the engineer operating the train is now facing disciplinary action.

...

New York and Atlantic Railway (NYA) President Paul Victor disagreed with notions that the gate malfunctioned, but conceded the Maspeth Avenue crossing’s design is flawed and requires improvement. The NYA reportedly asked the state Transportation Department to evaluate the signal system and the crossing’s logistics.

...

The crossing is part of the Long Island Rail Road’s Montauk branch extension, which is leased exclusively to NYA west of Jamaica for its freight rail operations. Wednesday’s accident raised concerns among local residents regarding the safety at other at-grade railroad crossings along the line, such as the one on 88th Street in Glendale.

...

With the line exclusively used for freight rail and all trains limited to 15 mph, the switches were relocated to within 10 to 20 feet of the crossing, he noted. Freight train operators were also instructed to slow down when coming to a crossing, then send a crew member out to check that the crossing gates were activated before proceeding.

These comments are beginning to steer away from the subject of this Thread. Please try to keep the discussion and comments relevant to the Thread topic.

What will become of the engineer and will the gate detection method be changed?

As the gate detection method works if the rules are followed.
I understand there's a 10 mph MAS for the line but sadly it looks like the human element has failed here.
I wonder what the engineer was thinking when he throttled up and what his work hours were.

A long time ago (1959) I drove a cab for Perrys Taxi in Elmont.
One night working the 6 to 6 shift I was returning to the stand empty at Meecham and the Turnpike when I fell asleep at the wheel.
The horrifying thing was I was aware I was falling asleep but could not move. It rook an huge effort to pull my foot off the gas.
The cab drifted to the right curb and bumped gently to a stop. The cab was running in drive, fortunate as it was a slight upgrade.
I woke up feeling completely refreshed after 20 minutes.
So my personal experience does raise the possibility of engineer fatigue.
It has happened as little digging around at NTSB.gov shows.
best
vince

We've been following this thread with keen interest. This is an interesting time in railroad safety.

As many posters know, "human error" is the leading cause of railroad accidents. Technology advances, and as greater automatic controls are perfected and implemented, they lessen the amount of human control that can contribute to an accident. Automatic Speed Control, which the LIRR was first to implement in 1951 limited the speed at which a signal could be passed. Automatic crossing gates abolished the gatemen's responsibility and his potential failures.

But the railroads are slow to implement technology. Several reasons for this are the permanence of their infrastructure, the capital costs, the need for a dependable supply and the time it takes to refine and prove a technology. The politically-touted Positive Train Control is an example of this. An imperfect technology, full of shortcomings is being forced upon the railroads at huge expense.

As technology proceeds and it is embraced by the common guy, he often can't understand why it's not immediately embraced by industry, like the railroads.

So we're at a crossroad. Up to this point, a General Notice advising enginemen to "operate at Restricted Speed" was safe and sufficient. Today, the public clamors for the same level of fail safe they enjoy with their washing machines. But that will take time.

The Lower Montauk Branch (which is now a Secondary Track) has an MAS of "Restricted Speed, not exceeding 10 MPH. Trains approaching crossings must stop and assure that the gates are down before proceeding. That did not happen. While the vast majority of highway crossings in this country have no grade protection at all, spectators seek to blame the LIRR for "ineffective" crossing protection.

Technology is no replacement of a poorly trained or reckless employee. Unfortunately, until fail-safe railroading advances to the point where it can become the standard, you will have the same sort of accidents that have plagued the LIRR since 1834.

https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L16739" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;

Admin Note: Brief, fair-use quote added

Federal Railroad Administration Launches Focused Safety Review of New York & Atlantic Railway

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) today launched a comprehensive, focused safety review of the New York & Atlantic Railway’s (NY&A) safety culture and management practices. Today’s announcement follows FRA’s launch of an investigation into the July 8, 2015, train-truck collision at Maspeth Avenue in Queens, New York. NY&A has committed their full cooperation as the safety review moves forward.

The safety analysis conducted by FRA will review NY&A Railway's compliance with federal regulations, its operational practices and its overall safety culture. The safety analysis team will be composed of multiple-discipline safety inspectors from FRA Region 1.

...

FRA’s rail safety team will look at:

NY&A operating departments;
Engineer and conductor certification;
Locomotive engineer oversight;
Grade crossings diagnostics;
Operation control center procedures and rail traffic controller training;
Human factors; and
Compliance with federal operating practices regulations.

Progressive Railroading

While the article does not mention LIRR, operation of the signals, etc. would seem to be in their purview, not NY&AR's. Without preempting LiquidCamphor's moderation, and knowing the two railroads are intertwined, we should probably keep this to LIRR involvement.

Here's the NY&AR thread: Slow moving Freight train hits Tractor-Trailer 7/8/2015

Brief, fair-use quote:

FRA launches safety review of New York & Atlantic Railway

Specifically, FRA inspectors will examine: NY&A operating departments, engineer and conductor certification, locomotive engineer oversight, grade crossing diagnostics, operation control center procedures and rail traffic controller training, human factors, and compliance with federal operating practices regulations.

After the review is completed, the FRA will report its findings and recommendations, and evaluate the short line’s follow-up to the recommendations.

"In this safety sweep of NY&A, FRA will provide recommendations on specific areas where the railroad must improve to meet the high safety standards FRA and the country expect," said Acting Federal Railroad Administrator Sarah Feinberg.

This thread is making me sick, providing I understand it correctly. Marine as rights over Rail and rail has rights over road.
Therefore if that is still the case no matter what road traffic must yeald to rail traffic.
Now modern crossing protection has created a dangerous situation. People are accustom to no light no bells no gate = no train.

Let me pose this question. What happens "if" the crossings on the lower Montauk were all unprotected.
Meaning nothing but cross bucks And advance warning sign? How would you approach such a crossing? They do exist across the river in Jersey and PA.

All the island circuits prevent is the crews having to get off the engine and man the crossing with flags and or fusees.
And you legally can have no protection with faster then 15mph in some states. How would a New York driver fair there?

Food for thought.

workextra wrote:Let me pose this question. What happens "if" the crossings on the lower Montauk were all unprotected. Meaning nothing but crossbucks And advance warning sign? How would you approach such a crossing? They do exist across the river in Jersey and PA.

There are a number of "passive" crossings in city limits, a few on CSX in South Bronx and quite a few in Brooklyn/Queens, including the NYA Bushwick Branch and the SBK/NJNY in Sunset Park.

As we examined in an earlier post, a primary cause of "human error" calls out for further investigation.

What if this engineer and conductor were temporary employees from the Midwest, who was hired by NYAR through a third-party leasing agency to fill a short term need? What if the NYAR's and the LIRR's permitted these employees to "qualify" on their physical characteristics after a two hour class?

Where would you place blame then?

Workextra makes an interesting point. If it was an unguarded crossing then it would be the responsibility of motor-vehicle drivers to approach the crossing expecting a train and to stop/yield to trains.

But it seems to me that if the railroad equips the crossing with automatic lights and gates then common sense (if not the law) would dictate that the railroad has assumed responsibility of warning drivers of approaching trains. And again common sense (if not the law) would dictate that if the gates and lights are not operating then it is safe for the public to cross the tracks.

And if a vehicle gets hit by a train because the crossing protection did not warn that a train was coming, the railroad is responsible and is at fault because they took over the responsibility of guarding the crossing with their protection equipment. That's all folks.........