Where High-Speed Rail Works Best

America 2050 has released a study Where High-Speed Rail Works Best. The study hypothesizes the necessary requirements for a successful HSR corridor and then ranks the various potential HSR corridors in the United States. The not-very-surprising conclusion of the study is that HSR is most suitable in 3 areas: the NEC, LA to the Bay Area and in a midwest network focused on Chicago. Secondary markets would most likely be LA to LV/AZ, the Pacific Northwest, Dallas to Houston, Tampa-Orlando-Miami, and Piedmont to DC.

Yonah Freemark has blogged on it in Establishing Objective, Realistic Assessment Tools for Planning an Effective High-Speed Rail Network

He likes the overall idea of working out objective criteria, but he has problems with some of the criteria in that study, like using the presence of existing rail transit.

Some of the commenters mentioned additional problems, like difficulty of construction (flat areas vs. mountainous areas) and amount of commitment of state politicians to rail-infrastructure building. VIrginia and North Carolina have shown much more commitment than South Carolina or Georgia, for instance.

But aside from that, the resulting map's priorities look fairly reasonable, and it broadly agrees with the HSR plans that are closest to implementation.

lpetrich wrote:

But aside from that, the resulting map's priorities look fairly reasonable, and it broadly agrees with the HSR plans that are closest to implementation.

Perhaps more to the point, at least in the case of the NEC and California, these corridors are becoming more viable primarily because natural economic forces arising primarily from congestion and a limited supply of land, rather than the whims of politicains, are rendering them more suitable for HSR development.

Such economic pressures are certainly important, but some places have gotten started than other, similar places. HSR systems have a sizable capital cost, and it takes political will to get it financed.

I think that urban-rail systems are a good comparison here -- their development has been very patchwork, with expansion going in haphazard fashion and one city getting it long before some similar neighboring city.

Likewise, I think that HSR development is having similar patchiness.

Well, here's a copy of a current editorial in Pittsburgh which I believe serves to illustrate how a lot of people well ouside the influence of the Beltway view the much-ballyhooed crop of current HSR proposals:

http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsbu ... 47310.html

And remember, this originated in a city which hosted an experimental "monorail" project; but it was so long ago that this writer, who just turned 60, was in his mid twenties at the time.

My point being: Suppose in five years, a modest economic recovery, coupled with refinery capacity that is unlikely ever to expand again, pushes the price of gasoline back up to the $4.00 level, or beyond? And suppose, that instead of the usual series of going-nowhere studies, the money were used to restore exurban rail service to a route pattern similar to that of 1959, using conventional technology, but with a eye to increasing speeds if the technology is feasible and not prohibitively expensive,

Better the dullard we know than the dreamer we don't.

lpetrich wrote:Such economic pressures are certainly important, but some places have gotten started than other, similar places. HSR systems have a sizable capital cost, and it takes political will to get it financed.

I think that urban-rail systems are a good comparison here -- their development has been very patchwork, with expansion going in haphazard fashion and one city getting it long before some similar neighboring city.

Likewise, I think that HSR development is having similar patchiness.

The development of all sorts of things is dependent on history and what's already there. "HSR" as it has developed here in America is predicated on (among other things, such as limited funding) the notion that America has the largest existing rail network of any country in the world and it would be silly to add completely new lines given the available infrastructure, or so the argument goes. I don't agree with all of it, but I do think the American HSR system will be "American" in its design in that it takes into account the American system we have.

It isn't always cost that often determines what gets done, but rather the existing infrastructure. Why does Chicago have 11 commuter rail lines all operated by Metra and one commuter rail line not operated by Metra (South Shore Line) while New York has three major commuter rail operators (NJT - 11 lines; Metro-North - 3 lines; and LIRR - 2 lines/8branches)? Because Chicago's rail system was developed by fewer railroads with Chicago at the center with all the railroads meeting near the middle while New York has much fewer connections since it was built over time by a number of much smaller rail lines that eventually merged (shotgun married) and became larger combinations of those older railroads (also that partially explains why there are so many more branch lines; there was no planned central point where the lines all were supposed to converge). Rail projects that involve new track are few and far between in the USA - the only major subway line that could be considered a success that has been built entirely in the past 50 years is the DC Metrorail system.

Applying that to NYC-Chicago, what's most likely is a combination of existing lines and new lines. The western half of the route is much flatter and straighter, and there it would be easier to upgrade, while the eastern portion is much more difficult. Scenic as it is, any route that uses the former PRR main line isn't HSR. I don't know about how feasible or smart it is, but I know at least someone in a public office will suggest building a HSR route to parallel the Pennsylvania Turnpike. A consideration of train usage on the existing NS line might also be in order - this month's Trains magazine had an article about the possibility and potential of shorter intermodal routes - would West Keystone see increasing intermodal usage? Other factors would also lead to changes in the ballgame for NYC-Chicago HSR. Here's what I think some of the likely factors are:

1. Increased intermodal demand. This would likely lead to increasing capacity. The most likely culprits are increased gas prices and road tolling. Pittsburgh-Philadelphia is mainly served by the Pennsylvania Turnpike and, to much smaller extents, I-80 and I-70. If either (or both) I-80 and I-70 became fully tolled roads, it would increase freight demand for NS. More intermodals means a need for better speeds since time is an issue for them (albeit that just means you have to be at least close to the truck travel time).
2. Increased gas prices. Leads to public demand for non-fuel intensive travel options.
3. Airline collapse. This is probably the worst case scenario since an airline collapse would be damaging for the transportation sector in general. However, generally Pittsburgh has already seen decreased airline service. Ironically, I think part of the reason why the Pittsburgh Maglev was suggested was to make the airport more appealing (and increase demand, which would somehow bring back US Airways even though US Airways has a Philadelphia hub and has clearly moved on from Pittsburgh. Considering US Airways has a hub in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania would lose a ton of economic strength if US Airways went under (leading to federal money and/or alternate travel options expanding). As of now there are only 93 daily flights from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia, and a cursory glance at the US Airways website shows 9 daily weekday non-stop flights (45 of the 93 weekly flights). 5 of those are with Regional jets. If US Airways were to go under (which has a good chance of happening in the next 10 years), it would mean the airline option would essentially disappear. Demand for the Pennsylvanian would increase, leading to upgrading the service and the route, which has spillover benefits for NYC-Chicago. In short, if you want to have HSR for NYC-Chicago, don't fly on US Airways.

Ironically, a strengthened position for Continental Airlines would also work; they can't compete with American and United at Chicago, they already have a working relationship with Amtrak, and the culture of efficiency engineered by Gordon Bethune is still present and has led to a willingness to limit regional routes in favor for codesharing where possible. If it becomes desirable to codeshare with Amtrak for longer and more train routes, we'll see the line grow east to west.

lpetrich wrote:HSR systems have a sizable capital cost, and it takes political will to get it financed.

You're right. It's simply not possible to build a railroad using private capital. History proves that, as every successful railroad was built by one government or another.

Sorry for such intense sarcasm, but, really, what other response to nonsense can one have?

the only major subway line that could be considered a success that has been built entirely in the past 50 years is the DC Metrorail system.

BART (but wrong gauge, so can't be extended on to "conventional" lines.

RussNelson wrote:

lpetrich wrote:HSR systems have a sizable capital cost, and it takes political will to get it financed.

You're right. It's simply not possible to build a railroad using private capital. History proves that, as every successful railroad was built by one government or another.

Sorry for such intense sarcasm, but, really, what other response to nonsense can one have?

He did not say built by the government , he said built taking political will .
you would have a hard time building a private line against the governments will . and most if not all had some form of subsidy , be it land grants or tax breaks , or trade concessions

He did not say built by the government , he said built taking political will .
you would have a hard time building a private line against the governments will . and most if not all had some form of subsidy , be it land grants or tax breaks , or trade concessions

A private company proposed to build a continental loading gauge freight line from the Tunnel to the north of England, using abandoned former railways. They failed to get Parliamentary consent. They claimed to be able to raise the capital without subsidy. It is hard to assess how much freight such a line would carry.

lpetrich wrote:

HSR systems have a sizable capital cost, and it takes political will to get it financed

Mr. Nelson and many of my less-reconstructable Objectivist friends would define "political will" as the chutzpah to use the state's legitimized monopoly on coericon to accomplish what would, in the hands of an ordinary citizen, be defined as robbery,

But that definition, while correct in the strictest empirical sense, can't always work in the real world. There are functons, such as police protection, which can't be completely assigned to the private sector. The problem here is that a little "common good" is like a little methedrine. --- the imagined benefit is immediate, the "mark" wants more , the downside doesn't show up for a while, and other people often end up paying the bill.

The end of the Age of Petroleum inveighs heavily in favor of the development of "concentrated" transport alternatives. Unfortunately, the last time that took place, in the early Twentieth Century, the politicians eventually de facto confiscated the systems via the ballot box, ran them into the ground, and only then acknowledged the need to restore them via the public purse, since no entrepreneur is going to leave his capital vulnerable to a den of thieves.

I know of no easy way to protect private investment in a culture of short-sight, and I harbor no illusion that anything turned over to the public sector will be not operated first and foremost for the benefit of the buureaucrats who manage it, with a sop or two thrown to its likely-unionized employees, who will enjoy the triple benefits of artificially high compensation, lifetime job security, and a government monopoly on the "services" they produce.

Slow, wasteful overly-politiaclly-managed development of rail systems seems to be nothing more than the least-harmful of a number of poor choices.

2nd trick op wrote: Mr. Nelson and many of my less-reconstructable Objectivist friends would define "political will" as the chutzpah to use the state's legitimized monopoly on coericon to accomplish what would, in the hands of an ordinary citizen, be defined as robbery,

But that definition, while correct in the strictest empirical sense, can't always work in the real world. There are functons, such as police protection, which can't be completely assigned to the private sector. The problem here is that a little "common good" is like a little methedrine. --- the imagined benefit is immediate, the "mark" wants more , the downside doesn't show up for a while, and other people often end up paying the bill.

This is why there are a lot of "moderately far right" authors such as Nozick; because objectivism is too far over and the moderate right (best exemplified by Milton Friedman) allows for too much reinterpretation, not to mention that the moderate right is predicated on a pragmatic, rather than philosophical position (again exemplified by Milton Friedman).

2nd trick op wrote:The end of the Age of Petroleum inveighs heavily in favor of the development of "concentrated" transport alternatives. Unfortunately, the last time that took place, in the early Twentieth Century, the politicians eventually de facto confiscated the systems via the ballot box, ran them into the ground, and only then acknowledged the need to restore them via the public purse, since no entrepreneur is going to leave his capital vulnerable to a den of thieves.

I know of no easy way to protect private investment in a culture of short-sight, and I harbor no illusion that anything turned over to the public sector will be not operated first and foremost for the benefit of the buureaucrats who manage it, with a sop or two thrown to its likely-unionized employees, who will enjoy the triple benefits of artificially high compensation, lifetime job security, and a government monopoly on the "services" they produce.

Slow, wasteful overly-politiaclly-managed development of rail systems seems to be nothing more than the least-harmful of a number of poor choices.

The alternative would be to simplify transportation policy and take a lesson from the Federal Reserve; government works best when it's apolitical. As I see it, the fact that transportation policy has evolved the way it has is due to a number of obsoleted and nuanced states' rights concerns and a highly problematic approach to the organization of the system (by mode). As I see it, funding should be given to "transportation" in general and in lump sums rather than for individual projects approved by the differing mode organizations. This should also be accompanied by a downsizing and shifting of priorities for the FAA, FHWA, FRA, and other similar organizations into nothing more than specialized regulatory agencies (which is already, at least to some extent, the case). the DOT should allocate funding for transportation projects in a process insulated from political considerations based on pragmatic benefits, with upper-limit restrictions on the percentage allowed for differing modes (to force balanced spending on transportation).

Finally, the different modes should have organizational priorities changed - the highways and railroads are primarily managed by the states, but this ignores the wider benefits and consequences of projects - case in point: Indiana's stubbornness with regard to the MWRRI. Organizationally, the regional level needs to be emphasized. I think that in principle, Amtrak's position that its future lies with the states could be workable, except that the states individually lack the resources to support Amtrak. A better solution is to emphasize the regional level, where you don't have misguided federal direction i.e. "mandates from Washington", but you also have more resources available.