by 2nd trick op
TO THE MODERATORS: This thread may be viewed as somewhat off-topic, but I'm starting it here because of the generally higher level of interest in similar subjects on the Amtrak Forum. Please feel free to move it.
A solid intermodal train with CSX power passed my HQ yesterday morning as I was getting off work. Several others were encountered one day last summer when CSX had a major derailment in upstate New York, but no further action was encountered yesterday; CSX power on the Reading Line is normally rare.
My point being that the remaining major railroads do not seem as willing to share each others' trackage in case of an emergency, and at a time when the combination of increasing traffic and reduced physical plant have likely increased the vulnerability of the entire system.
Admittedly, the basic conditions of rail operation have changed considerably from the days when PRR restored some semblance of service on what is now the NEC within twelve hours of the derailment of the Congressional under wartime conditions in 1943. Alternative means can usually be arranged if the volume of traffic isn't too heavy or the interruption too long. And in a post-industrial economy, the best approach is sometimes to just "ride out the storm".
But I do believe that the Upper Mississippi floods of 1994 demonstrated that our rail network becomes increasingly vulnerable as the number of alternative routes are reduced. Elsewhere, the growing pressure to revive local medium-distance passenger service or allow a few redundant main lines to evolve into corridors is going to further strain the capacity of the remaining lines. NS probably couldn't respond to a loss of its Pittsburgh Line as easily as PC and Conrail did in the floods of 1972 and 1977.
In the Northeast, at least, much of the capacity itself is still there; the former PRR Trenton Cutoff, the former Erie across New York's southern tier, the Lehigh Valley west of Wilkes-Barre and PRR's former Northern Region main (Harrisburg-Buffalo) are still essentially intact. But my point here is that the familiarity with the lines by the operating departments has probably become rusty, and a sudden-and-substantial increase in traffic might add enough strain to knock out the backup system. Then we're really up the "well-known creek".
Those of us who follow the rail indsutry on a daily basis posess a far deeper acquaintance with the realities and constraints of rail operation than does the general public. This knowledge dovetails nicely with the emerging realization that the changed realities of petroleum economics are finally going to force a re-orientation of our transportation system, both freight and passenger.
Finally, there remains the issue of the war on terror. Those of us who are familiar with the infrastructure of the Eastern seaboard can recognize any number of vulnerable locations without tipping our hand to anyone who might be watching with the wrong intentions. Again, backups and alternatives exist in many cases, but there is sometimes a question of how long these measures can hold up.
Regardless of anyone's personal feelings toward our military actions in recent years, reorientation of some of that effort toward strengthening our internal transport system might prove a wiser investment. (Let's remember that defense concerns were cited in the funding of the Interstate Highway System, now over 50 years ago.) The new realities of transportation probably justify re-orienting some of that system back toward the use of rail service in the primary role. And if this facilitates the revival of suitable, adaptable passenger service, hopefully on a decentralized, case-by-case basis, so much the better.
A solid intermodal train with CSX power passed my HQ yesterday morning as I was getting off work. Several others were encountered one day last summer when CSX had a major derailment in upstate New York, but no further action was encountered yesterday; CSX power on the Reading Line is normally rare.
My point being that the remaining major railroads do not seem as willing to share each others' trackage in case of an emergency, and at a time when the combination of increasing traffic and reduced physical plant have likely increased the vulnerability of the entire system.
Admittedly, the basic conditions of rail operation have changed considerably from the days when PRR restored some semblance of service on what is now the NEC within twelve hours of the derailment of the Congressional under wartime conditions in 1943. Alternative means can usually be arranged if the volume of traffic isn't too heavy or the interruption too long. And in a post-industrial economy, the best approach is sometimes to just "ride out the storm".
But I do believe that the Upper Mississippi floods of 1994 demonstrated that our rail network becomes increasingly vulnerable as the number of alternative routes are reduced. Elsewhere, the growing pressure to revive local medium-distance passenger service or allow a few redundant main lines to evolve into corridors is going to further strain the capacity of the remaining lines. NS probably couldn't respond to a loss of its Pittsburgh Line as easily as PC and Conrail did in the floods of 1972 and 1977.
In the Northeast, at least, much of the capacity itself is still there; the former PRR Trenton Cutoff, the former Erie across New York's southern tier, the Lehigh Valley west of Wilkes-Barre and PRR's former Northern Region main (Harrisburg-Buffalo) are still essentially intact. But my point here is that the familiarity with the lines by the operating departments has probably become rusty, and a sudden-and-substantial increase in traffic might add enough strain to knock out the backup system. Then we're really up the "well-known creek".
Those of us who follow the rail indsutry on a daily basis posess a far deeper acquaintance with the realities and constraints of rail operation than does the general public. This knowledge dovetails nicely with the emerging realization that the changed realities of petroleum economics are finally going to force a re-orientation of our transportation system, both freight and passenger.
Finally, there remains the issue of the war on terror. Those of us who are familiar with the infrastructure of the Eastern seaboard can recognize any number of vulnerable locations without tipping our hand to anyone who might be watching with the wrong intentions. Again, backups and alternatives exist in many cases, but there is sometimes a question of how long these measures can hold up.
Regardless of anyone's personal feelings toward our military actions in recent years, reorientation of some of that effort toward strengthening our internal transport system might prove a wiser investment. (Let's remember that defense concerns were cited in the funding of the Interstate Highway System, now over 50 years ago.) The new realities of transportation probably justify re-orienting some of that system back toward the use of rail service in the primary role. And if this facilitates the revival of suitable, adaptable passenger service, hopefully on a decentralized, case-by-case basis, so much the better.
Last edited by 2nd trick op on Fri Dec 21, 2007 2:59 pm, edited 4 times in total.
What a revoltin' development this is! (William Bendix)