The FRA takes action after Spuyten Duvyil accident

[Clean Cab]

The C&S Engineer should be able to come up with modifications to the signal system where if the RTC has traffic set for southbound between CP12 and CP10 the cab signals will display something less favorable than a clear when a train is approaching the curve, but in the same block with traffic set northbound can display a clear as the train will already be through the curve since cab signal code is always fed to the track from the opposite end of the block the train enters from.

That is what most likely will happen. The RTC can hold the signal at CP 10 and that would force a cab signal downgrade for a train heading southbound at DV curve. But that would not work at the other proposed locations. One thing worth noting about this incident, if train #8808 had been operating on track #4 between CP 12 and CP 11, it would have gotten two can signal downgrades and this incident would never have happened.

[DutchRailnut]

I believe it was dropped to either 80 or 70. Dutch would know.

the roughly 4 mile section of 90 mph was dropped to 80 max, which only adds about 1/2 minute to travel time between CP217 and CP223

[RearOfSignal]

The C&S Engineer should be able to come up with modifications to the signal system where if the RTC has traffic set for southbound between CP12 and CP10 the cab signals will display something less favorable than a clear when a train is approaching the curve, but in the same block with traffic set northbound can display a clear as the train will already be through the curve since cab signal code is always fed to the track from the opposite end of the block the train enters from.

That is what most likely will happen. The RTC can hold the signal at CP 10 and that would force a cab signal downgrade for a train heading southbound at DV curve. But that would not work at the other proposed locations. One thing worth noting about this incident, if train #8808 had been operating on track #4 between CP 12 and CP 11, it would have gotten two can signal downgrades and this incident would never have happened.

Actually I believe it drops straight to Medium Cab from Normal Cab. But I don't think it drops until the head end clears CP 12.

[Clean Cab]

The C&S Engineer should be able to come up with modifications to the signal system where if the RTC has traffic set for southbound between CP12 and CP10 the cab signals will display something less favorable than a clear when a train is approaching the curve, but in the same block with traffic set northbound can display a clear as the train will already be through the curve since cab signal code is always fed to the track from the opposite end of the block the train enters from.

That is what most likely will happen. The RTC can hold the signal at CP 10 and that would force a cab signal downgrade for a train heading southbound at DV curve. But that would not work at the other proposed locations. One thing worth noting about this incident, if train #8808 had been operating on track #4 between CP 12 and CP 11, it would have gotten two can signal downgrades and this incident would never have happened.

Actually I believe it drops straight to Medium Cab from Normal Cab. But I don't think it drops until the head end clears CP 12.

It's been quite a long time since I ran a train on the Hudson Line (2001?) and I seem to recall the cab dropping to limited either near Riverdale or entering CP 12 and down to medium exiting CP 12. But I could be mistaken.

[Tommy Meehan]

When does this have to be implemented by? The EO says Metro-North must "provide the FRA with a list of main track locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph in the maximum authorized passenger train speed by December 10, 2013." Then it says, "In the meantime, Metro-North is ordered to operate trains with two qualified train crew members..." What does in the "meantime" mean?

I agree there is an element of 'closing the barn door after the horse is already out' to this. Realistically I think this is a case of Metro-North being singled out by FRA because of past events. In some ways I think FRA is trying to humiliate senior management in order to motivate them. At least that's the way it looks to many persons outside the railroad industry that have dealt with regulators in other fields. (In my case with the FDA.) Once you get them ticked off at you they can and will make your life miserable.

[Clean Cab]

My take on it is, identify locations, use crew members to ensure compliance and we'll get back to you. I think this order is very vague and looks like it was quickly thrown together. And why is MN the only railroad affected by it?

[DutchRailnut]

The main body of order page 13 says it must be implemented immediately.

[Tommy Meehan]

I wonder if we'll see any timetable changes? Schedules lengthened? Bad time of year to do it if it happens. All the Holiday travelers.

Also I guess I forgot the Gennies have no rear access from the head coach. So I guess at some locations going outbound the conductor will have to board the locomotive at stations and ride to the next one. That'll be unpleasant when it's snowing or icy.

[DutchRailnut]

except at most stations the Genesis is OFF the platform, they will probably have to assign a extra crew member.

[Bill D]

Some observations from riding the New Haven Line yesterday (both directions on limited stop "Shoppers Specials"). There seemed to be more speed restrictions than usual, so many that the train was about 18 minutes late into GCT. A conductor was up front for most of the trips in both directions. On the morning trip, even when the conductor was not by the cab door, he was sitting in the front seat (M-2,4,6 set) where he could hear what was going on in the cab. What I found most interesting though was the fact that several passengers came up to the front to look out the window and into the cab when it was open. Not just the usual parent / child visits, but some adults on their own. A couple of them commented to the crew how complicated it appeared to operate the train. I appreciated that the crew was friendly to the inquiries. This is probably better public relations than any statement that management could make. Nobody appeared concerned riding the train, just curious about what goes on up front.

[Pensey GG1]

The more safety components are added the more complacency becomes a problem.

That's why we need full PTC. Then we don't really have to care.

[ThirdRail7]

The more safety components are added the more complacency becomes a problem.

That's why we need full PTC. Then we don't really have to care.

Until something happens to the system and the people are no longer sharp. I liken it to the GPS systems that cause people to turn down one way streets and into the path of oncoming trains all because they no longer "think" about what they are doing. They are just doing what they are instructed by the computer. When it is off, people aren't as adept and aware of their surroundings. This is one of the main reasons why the Washington Metro makes sure their members run the trains manually every so often (monthly?). A conditioned response will only carry you so far.

[Jersey_Mike]

Until something happens to the system and the people are no longer sharp. I liken it to the GPS systems that cause people to turn down one way streets and into the path of oncoming trains all because they no longer "think" about what they are doing. They are just doing what they are instructed by the computer. When it is off, people aren't as adept and aware of their surroundings. This is one of the main reasons why the Washington Metro makes sure their members run the trains manually every so often (monthly?). A conditioned response will only carry you so far.

What's worse is when the flaky PTC system breaks down and the now less attuned crews have to deal with "unassisted" operation. It's like the Koren Air B777 trying to land without the ILS out in San Francisco a few months back.

[Tadman]

Until something happens to the system and the people are no longer sharp. I liken it to the GPS systems that cause people to turn down one way streets and into the path of oncoming trains all because they no longer "think" about what they are doing. They are just doing what they are instructed by the computer. When it is off, people aren't as adept and aware of their surroundings. This is one of the main reasons why the Washington Metro makes sure their members run the trains manually every so often (monthly?). A conditioned response will only carry you so far.

What's worse is when the flaky PTC system breaks down and the now less attuned crews have to deal with "unassisted" operation. It's like the Koren Air B777 trying to land without the ILS out in San Francisco a few months back.

I couldn't agree with this more. This sums up why I so strongly object to PTC.

[Clean Cab]

I prefer the ground based ACSES system used by Amtrak on their tracks from New Haven to Boston. It relays information into the rails via transponders mounted on the tracks and does not use GPS as it's primary source. Granted it is not as flexible as PTC (guarding work areas, adding/removing temporary speed restrictions) but it's work fine for 14 years now without any incidents.