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Hot Times on the High Iron - Today We Do Another Study in Cranial Rectal Inversion
About the Author
JD Santucci

J. D. Santucci (a.k.a. "Tuch") began his railroading career in 1978 as a trainman on the Missouri Pacific. After a round of lay-offs in 1985, Tuch embarked on a railroad odyssey, working in many different situations for different roads. This column tries to explain some of the nuts and bolts of the job and also demonstrates what we have to deal with on a regular basis within and without the industry. Tuch currently works through freights out of Chicago for Canadian National/Illinois Central.

©1999, 2003-2007 JD Santucci.
Logo ©2002 The Railroad Network.

Hot Times on the High Iron Logo
By J.D. Santucci

May 20, 2004
After the intensity of last week's column, I decided it was time to take a look at some of the events that occur without tragic results this week. Nobody was injured in any of the following episodes. However, pride was decimated.

As learned from past issues of this topic, we oftentimes encounter situations and episodes generally brought forth from momentary lapses of good judgment; serious cases of head up assitis. In any event I have pulled a few more case scenarios out of the files from which we will study here.

"His mind is definitely not right."

Our first case study occurred at a well known commuter railroad at which I once worked. I have to reveal this much of it, but will not reveal the poor soul involved. If I'm not mistaken though, he is retired now, so we won't really be singling him out. Well, I should rephrase that and say we won't be revealing his name. There will be lights shining all over him, although indirectly.

This railroad operated a five evening per week local that operated between downtown Chicago and Kensington. It made all the stops in between these two mentioned points. In order to accommodate this move while not delaying other trains, the local was operated against the current of traffic between 67th Street and Kensington. To gain this authority, a block was established between these two stations and you received verbal authority to operate against the current between them. Not a really big deal as this procedure was routinely coordinated five evenings per week.

Well, the Engineer involved this particular evening had been working the combination that made this run for several weeks. All movements were following each in other in proper sequence and all was right with the world and the railroad gods were pleased. However, on this one night in particular, a bout of cranial rectal inversion occurred. For whatever reason, the Engineer somehow managed to forget to make the scheduled station stop at 63rd Street. How he failed to remember to stop was beyond me. He had made this stop five nights per week for quite some time. It should have almost been an auto pilot type move.

Upon realizing, far too late, that he blew it, the Engineer contacted Randolph Control to let them know of this failure, commonly referred to as "seat box failure" by the Superintendent. The Engineer asked if it would be okay to just disregard the stop and take those passengers planning to get off there down to 75th Street instead. The response was "No, you will return to 63rd Street."

Now owing to a horrible and tragic wreck on this route in 1972 account a train overshooting a station and then backing up into it, back up moves on this route were strictly prohibited. So to accomplish a return to the 63rd Street station, the Engineer would have to change ends on the train and operate it in a forward move in the northward direction. To achieve all this, he would cut out all the controls at the south end, walk through the train, open up the control compartment on the north end, cut the controls in, get and air test and then get permission and a signal to proceed north back to the 63rd Street station.

This sounds like a relatively simple move and for all practical purposes, it is. The problem is two fold though; it takes time and it totally disrupts to operation. The morning and evening rush trains are operated on tight schedules. Every facet of the operation requires precise timing with very little room or margin for error. A disruption such as this can create a ripple or domino effect to the numerous other trains causing a disruption in the timing of their headways thus forcing them all to operate behind schedule.

So the changing of the ends was accomplished, a new air test completed, permission and the proper signal given and the move was carried out. Now once they returned to 63rd Street, the controlling ends again had to be changed with the Engineer returning to the south end, getting a new air test and the receiving permission to return south and completing the run. Again, this takes time and you could almost hear the all those dominos falling. Fortunately for me, my train was already south of this location. I did listen in closely to all the radio conversation involved though making all sorts of mental notes.

The most important radio conversation pertaining to this entire episode was the following; "Before you tie up this evening, make certain to contact 7800." 7800 was the telephone extension and also the radio call sign of the District Superintendent. You just knew there was a major ass chewing in the works here. I'm not certain any excuse, no matter how legitimate or real could get this guy out of this predicament. I'm not certain that even if there was some nut with a gun at the Engineer's head would have been accepted as the reason for failing to make a the scheduled stop at the station.

I cannot recall though, if the Engineer received any type of discipline over this major failure. I know there are several employees from this railroad who receive this little diatribe of mine, so I would be willing to bet at least one of them will be able to provide such information.

"I coulda, I shoulda and I woulda, but I didn't."

Our next mishap took place on a double track portion of railroad. The crew involved was given authority via a track warrant, to come out of a siding and enter main track number one. Number one main was the main track right next to the siding on which the train this crew was sitting happened to be parked. Number two track was the next track over and based on the authority received in this particular track warrant, track two was not supposed to be a factor.

Track number two was not supposed to be a factor.

The train this particular crew was getting had been tied up at this location the day previous and was a work train. This crew was cabbed out to this location to get the train. The Conductor involved had just been promoted and this was his maiden voyage in charge. He was not familiar with the territory involved but that did not matter. He was a warm body used to fill a hot spot and that was all that mattered. The Engineer involved should have known better but apparently and quite obviously did not, as you will soon discover.

For whatever reason, the Engineer thought the track next to the siding was track two and the one further over was track one. He informed the Conductor that they would need to cross over to the far track in order to enter their limits. Now logic would have dictated that in order to get there from here, they would have needed authority to occupy BOTH main tracks, not just one of them. But this particular individual would never be confused with being a logical person, so there would be no logic involved as part of the equation here.

The switch was lined from the siding to track one, they entered and restored this switch to its normal position and then headed down to a set of crossovers between the main tracks. Upon arriving there, the Engineer informed the Conductor to line those switches to crossover to the other main track. Once this move was completed and all switches restored normal, this guy proceeds to inform the Dispatcher they were clear of what he thought was track two and now on track one. BUSTED! He gave himself up and wound up getting disciplined and decertified for thirty days.

Fortunately for the crew involved, there was no train anywhere close on the track they were not authorized to be on, so there was no imminent disaster in store. The potential was there, the recipe was just not quite ripe for it though, and in this particular case, that was a good thing. While the railroad gods were playing their devilish little game with this crew, they were not flirting with true disaster.

Another guy was working a local freight assignment. His job would normally receive a train order each day authorizing them to operate between points A and E. As part of this order was a line instructing them not to pass B, C and D. The reason for this was they were operating in non-signaled territory and there was always another train ahead of them. This first train would also get an order to operate from A to E with a line instructing them to report clear of B, C and D. In effect, this was like setting up a manual block system. This railroad was operating with no cabooses, so operating in this manner eliminated the need for the first train to be required to provide flag protection against the following train. There were absolute blocks set up behind them at all times.

In the case of the first train not having enough power to reach and maintain track speed, it also prevented the second train from catching up to and possibly running into the first train. Also, the first train had to stop and perform a pick up along the way, so this constituted a delay which could cause also the second train to catch him. Being that the first train only had an Engineer and Conductor, there was no crew member to provide flag protection when the train was stopped and performing this work, so this manual blocking method worked quite effectively.

As the first train reported clear of each point, the Train Dispatcher would then issue an order to the second train to pass a particular point. For example, when the first train reported clear of C, the second train was given a train order authorizing them to proceed past B. When the first train reported clear of D, the second train would then get an order to pass C. This spaced the trains out and always kept the second train one block behind the first train. It was a pretty good system that actually worked quite well.

Now on the day in question, for whatever reason though, the Dispatcher cut a different order to the second train only given them rights between A and C. When the order was issued to allow them to pass B, the Engineer on this train took his copy of the order and placed it over his running order. The train arrived at C and performed some switching of industries and interchange with the railroad that crossed and connected there.

With their work completed the crew departed C. There was only one little problem; they had no authority to depart as they only had rights to C. They operated all the way to E. Normally upon arrival at E they swapped trains with another crew that came off a branch line there. If the other train wasn't there yet, they would head into the siding at E and wait in the clear. This day their return train had yet to arrive, so they entered the siding and cleared up to wait for their outbound train. When they reported the fact they were in the clear to the Dispatcher, he was somewhat shocked and rather upset.

He instructed the crew to go to the phone and call him to discuss this situation at greater length. While nothing tragic occurred from this episode, it could have. There was an opposing train headed at them. If this train had been somewhat further along, the results could have been a "cornfield meet," more commonly known to non-railroaders as a head on collision.

In this case, the entire crew was suffering from cranial rectal inversion, not just the Engineer. The set of checks and balances used by a crew were overlooked in this case. The Conductor is supposed to remind the Engineer about their approach to the end of running limits on an order. If the Conductor fails to perform this reminder, the Brakeman is supposed to do the reminding. They are also supposed to take the time to discuss their operating rights in advance of their departure from the initial terminal. Today this is known as a "job briefing."

Again, here is a case of the potential for something tragic to occur, but it didn't. The railroad gods in their bizarre and demented sort of way were smiling. They allowed this crew to tempt fate and cheat it. But not without striking a little fear into the hearts of those dispatching on and operating over the said rail line.

Carry on.

And so it goes.

Tuch

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