About the Author J. D. Santucci (a.k.a. "Tuch") began his railroading career in 1978 as a trainman on the Missouri Pacific. After a round of lay-offs in 1985, Tuch embarked on a railroad odyssey, working in many different situations for different roads. This column tries to explain some of the nuts and bolts of the job and also demonstrates what we have to deal with on a regular basis within and without the industry. Tuch currently works through freights out of Chicago for Canadian National/Illinois Central. ©1999, 2003-2007 JD Santucci. Logo ©2002 The Railroad Network. By J.D. Santucci

February 27, 2004
If you're old enough to remember Jimmy Walker's character "JJ" on the TV show "Good Times," you'll recall that he used to use the word dynamite far too frequently. And he always said it as "DI-NOOOO-MITE!!! I didn't like him, the show or that stupid way he spoke this word. Fortunately, this column is not about that. Nor will it be about the explosive material that brings down old buildings and bridges or is used by those nut job screwballs performing those suicide bombings.

Instead, we will discuss temperamental freight cars. A dynamiter is a car that causes an undesired emergency application (UDE) of the train's air brakes when the train brakes are used for routine stops or slow downs. Dynamiters are also known as kickers. It is one of those terms that vary from railroad to railroad.

Every rail car used on all railroads must have a functioning air brake system. Well let me clarify that a bit, every car used outside of captive industrial operation or outside of a mechanical servicing facility must have a functional brake system. There are some cars that are confined solely within the limits of the trackage of an industry that do not have functioning air brake systems. Cars like this are not allowed to be used outside of such industrial trackage.

The air brake system on rail cars makes use of a control valve, which is mounted under or on one end of the car depending upon what type of car it is. The control valve is the successor of the original triple valve invented by George Westinghouse. The Westinghouse Air Brake Company (WABCO) was the company eventually created to manufacture and market the device.

Prior to the air brake system, train speeds were controlled by Brakemen that rode the cars in the train. They would move from car to car applying or releasing the hand brakes to control the speed. The Engineer would give whistle signals to instruct the Brakemen whether to apply or release them. This was a very dangerous occupation as the Brakemen walked across the tops of the cars, passing from car to car on the moving trains to perform their braking tasks. This was the original reason rail cars had roof walkways. Many Brakemen were killed or severely injured over the years this method of operation was used.

Now aside from being labor intensive and incredibly dangerous, this system lent itself to be unreliable. Suppose the train separated and none of the Brakemen were on the portion of the train that came apart, there was nothing to stop these cars. Westinghouse invented the first automatic train braking system and the rest as they say, is history.

Over the years the triple valve was improved upon. Such improvements on the system continue today. There have been changes within the industry that produces brake equipment as well. WABCO merged with Pulse Electronics few years ago to form a new company called Wabtec. Pulse was the company most noted for manufacturing end of train telemetry systems and other electric and electronic railroad hardware such as speedometers and event recorders. Today Wabtec continues to produce air brake components along with railroad electronics.

The current control valves, while far superior to those produced just thirty or forty years ago are not perfect. Great perhaps, but still not perfect. But I'm sure the research and development people there at Wabtec and at Knorr (which consists in part of the old New York Air Brake Company) are working like crazy to achieve some sort of perfection. Of course, being the rail industry is the way it is, they will find a way to somehow undermine both the per and the fect in perfect.

Sometimes control valves develop "technical" difficulties. These valves are mechanical, even though they are entirely air operated, and things still go wrong with them. Sometimes the difficulty is caused by excess moisture in the brake pipe. Other times components within the control valve fail or just wear out. And I'm certain that years of getting banged and bashed around don't help their cause either. While designed for many years of reliable service, control valves are not designed to last forever. Gotta have that wear and planned obsolescence otherwise the manufacturers would go broke.

Now sometimes it is not the control valve causing the problem. Instead there may be another fault within the brake system. Hoses that are a little too stiff in cold weather may develop a leak at certain times, like when passing through curves or turnouts. Just enough leakage occurring about the time the Engineer applies the brakes may cause a control valve on one of the cars at that precise location to sense a rapid reduction of brake pipe pressure. This will trigger an emergency application of the brakes.

Other times there could be leakage from within the piping itself. Cracks may develop or welded or threaded connections may begin to fail. On cars with end of car cushioning devices, flexible tubing and slip joints are used to compensate for the moving portions on the ends of each car. Such components may also fail over time. The motion of it bending and straightening out will cause wear on the material used for construction. Age also causes the rubber based material to deteriorate as well. Leaks may develop with the hoses at the end of the cars as they too, will begin to wear out as well.

There has been significant study and research performed over the years with the UDE phenomenon. Over the years intermodal trains have tended to provide more of this problem than other types of trains. Research also indicates that westbound trains tend to suffer from the problem more often than eastbound trains. Such studies have been silent on UDE's in northbound and southbound trains though. All of the problems mentioned in the paragraph above have been indicated to be some of the culprits. When problems develop in the control valve or from the mentioned leaks, they tend to make life for train crews, particularly the Engineer a living hell. One example of this is the dynamiter that don't always dynamite when you use the air. They will only do it on occasion and you never know exactly when it is going to happen. While any dynamiter is a huge pain in the ass, the occasional one has you on edge every time you touch the air as you wonder if this is the time it is going to pop.

The location of a dynamiter in the train can also wreak havoc. Depending upon the exact location of it and the circumstance for which you are using the air, you can and often do get an undesired train separation. This would be a broken couple knuckle or (shudder) a drawbar. A broken drawbar is a really disaster as they cannot be replaced with any ease in the field. You need the assistance of a hoist and several qualified employees to make this repair. Normally, a broken drawbar requires that the car has to be set out of the train. Also, a broken drawbar can cause a derailment as it is entirely possible that a car behind that broken drawbar could actually run over it and get knocked off the tracks.

While I have experienced the problem of the car that only dynamites when it is "in the mood" many times over the years, one particular occasion resulted in a break in two. The dynamite action only occurred a couple of times en route, but I knew the potential for it to happen again was there. I had dynamic braking available and was able to use it for most slowdowns and a couple of stops. In the circumstance that triggered the break in two of the train, I was bringing my northbound train to a stop at Homewood. When coming north on the CN Chicago Sub you are coming down a fairly respectable grade. A heavy tonnage train is not so willing or cordial and coupled with Newton's theory of gravity, doesn't always want to allow the dynamic brakes only to bring it to a stop.

If you do not have sufficient dynamic braking available to you, it is necessary to use the air brakes to assist you in bringing the train to a safe and controlled stop. This particular day I was facing that very situation; I needed to use air with the dynamic. Of course this would be the time the dynamiter would rear up its ugly head and dump on me. I had the slack all bunched up against the engines which were in full dynamic. While I was able to slow the train, the dynamic was not sufficient to bring the train to a stop at the stop signal. I set a little air and when the reduction made it to the tail end of the train, it went into emergency.

What was now happening was this; the tail end of the train was now rapidly advancing this emergency application forward towards the engines at that rate of about 900 feet per second. Being that I had a hold of some 7000+ feet of train already, the emergency application would not reach the engines for seven or so seconds depending upon exactly where towards the tail end of the train the suspect car was actually located. The tail end was now also coming to a quick stop while the head end, while slowing was not stopping as fast. This action was causing the slack that was bunched from the dynamic braking effort to now run or pull back out. Draft force (slack stretched) of 450,000 lbs will cause a knuckle to break. And of course a broken knuckle causes the train to come apart. In this particular case, the train held together up to the thirty-seventh car behind the engine. This was the spot referred to as the "node" of the train where the slack changed from stretched to bunched. Being that everything behind this point was coming to a rapid stop and everything ahead of it was not, this was also the point where the 450,000 pounds of draft force suddenly took effect.

I could have dumped the air on the engines to possibly prevent this action from occurring, but we have this strange phenomenon that occurs between Stuenkel and Chicago on the Chicago Subdivision and also on the Joliet and Freeport Subs. On the Chicago Sub side the 1500 volt direct current wires from the neighboring Metra Electric line emit radio frequency (RF). Sometimes this RF will create interference with the communication link between our head and tail end telemetry devices. On the Joliet and Freeport Subs we have the CTA's Orange Line that parallels us for several miles. We get the same interference effect from that operation.

At times the air pressure reading on the head end control display unit (CDU) will suddenly drop to "00" (the default setting of the system) and the alarm will sound that there was a rapid drop in brake pipe pressure. Usually it will come back within a moment or two. Sometimes you have to hit the communication test button to restore the link. But in any event, you are getting a false indication of a loss of air. So with that in mind, you don't want to go and dump the air on the head end of the train as there actually may be no real reason for such action.

Under a situation where you have the slack stretched and the dynamiter is towards the rear, again the head end is not beginning to stop while the tail end is. This also creates excessive draft force which can and oftentimes does break a knuckle. Under this type of circumstance, you'll usually feel a change in slack after the CDU announces a rapid reduction of brake pipe pressure. When this occurs, I will quickly drop the throttle from whatever position I have it set to run 1. This will help reduce the draft force somewhat. And it has probably saved me from getting more than one knuckle. This method is not foolproof though as sometimes the damage has been done before you can even react.

With an emergency application of the brakes at anytime, the Engineer no longer has control of the train brakes. The series of events unleashed once an emergency application has been initiated either from within the train or by the Engineer must be completed. You cannot stop the sequence of events once they have begun. This means you no longer have any true control of the train. While there are tasks you can perform to try to minimize some of the effects, you really do not control all of the slack action that is occurring within the train.

The make up of the train, the placement of loads and empties throughout, will dictate much of what happens with the slack action within as the train begins to come to a stop. As the dynamics of the train are changing rapidly as the train begins to stop, draft and buff forces are occurring throughout the entire consist; the higher the speed, the more action that can and will occur. The geographic location of the train at the time of the emergency application with regards to the terrain and lay of the track may also be a factor. If the train is on passing through a curve or a turnout at the time the UDE takes place, it may also factor into the effect of the rapidly changing slack. Sometimes the dynamic forces of the slack action may cause a derailment. Other times it may cause a load on a car to shift or even the track bed to shift. Then other times nothing bad at all may happen. Being that there are plenty of horrible circumstances that might occur most railroads have rules requiring the entire train be inspected after any emergency application of the brakes.

Some railroads modify these rules for certain situations or train types. For example, CSX does not require intermodal trains to be inspected after an emergency application of the brakes. Under most circumstances CN does not require a walking inspection except on trains designated as "Key" trains. These are trains that are hauling certain types and amounts of designated hazardous materials. Some roads take every precaution. Conrail not only required the entire train be inspected, they also held trains on adjacent tracks until it was positively ascertained that such adjacent track was also not fouled by a possible derailment of the train in emergency. Conrail also required the next train through the area on that same track operate at restricted speed between designated locations looking for potential track problems as a result of the emergency application.

There is a specific method to recover from it once the entire train has gone into emergency, but this procedure cannot be undertaken until that emergency application has completed its run through the entire train. And being that an emergency application travels at about 900 feet per second, with a train of any appreciable length, it will take some time for the entire train to even be in emergency. And then the rules clearly state that you must not attempt to recover from such an application until the train has come to a complete stop.

In attempting to determine about where a dynamiter is located within a train, here is where common sense and logic come into play. When making a service brake application of the train brakes, the time it takes for the dynamiter to cause a UDE will give you a clue. If the air dumps very quickly when making the brake application this would indicate the problem car is closer to the head end. If it takes awhile for the air to dump it should mean the car is more towards the tail end. Having the end of train telemetry system helps greatly in determining such a problem as opposed to the days when we had cabooses. Back in the days of cabooses, whenever you went into emergency the only information coming from the boys in the back was usually the comment "Did you do that?" after the train went into emergency.

So now with all this information and background, we delve into the meat and potatoes of today's lesson.

We were called for our regular 336 train out of Glenn Yard on 20 February 04. After some time we were finally ready to get our air test. When I set the brakes the train went into emergency. No air test here; contrary to what some officials I have encountered at more than one railroad think, an emergency brake application is not, I repeat not an air test. After recovering the emergency and recharging the air we attempted the air test again. Things worked right the second time around and we proceeded with the brake test. Once highballed and ready to go we began our trip.

The first time I attempted to use the air to stop was for the stop board at the Panhandle (Brighton Park). As luck would have it the train went into emergency. Judging from the way it went, I believed the problem was at the tail end. Once we got stopped, I recovered the air and began pumping up the brake pipe again. However the air was not coming back up. Conductor JJ Niemann (certainly not to be confused with the character Jimmy Walker portrayed on "Good Times") had to wind up walking the train to find and hopefully correct the problem.

After walking much of our 122 car train, he discovered a problem with the hose one of the cars. It was a long hose that owing to some sort of previous half-assed repair, was not sliding back and forth properly as the cushioned drawbar on the car moved. This caused the hose to bunch up enough to create a partial separation between the hose on those two cars. This partial separation was enough to allow brake pipe pressure to escape preventing the rest of the train behind it from charging back up properly.

With the assistance of the Millsdale Local crew, the Glenn Yard Trainmaster, my trusty role of duct tape and about one and a half hours of time, the problem was corrected and we were on our way again. While I was hoping this might solve our dynamiter problem I still had my reservations.

We continued our journey snaking through the City of Chicago and the 10 MPH track. As we were crossing 21st Street (NS and Amtrak crossing) and approached 16th Street (Metra Rock Island crossing) I had to set some air. We are dropping down a short steep grade here and the train will start pushing you up and over the 10 MPH speed limit through here. I had no choice but to set the brakes on the train. As the air was just about finished exhausting from the automatic brake valve, POW! Once again we were in emergency.

We contacted the Desk One Dispatcher again to notify him of our dilemma. After a few minutes I lost communication with the end of train telemetry. With the Chicago Transit Authority Orange Line paralleling us on the south side here, we often encounter some problems with RF jamming the communication link between the CDU on the head end and the end of train device (EOT) on the tail end. The CTA uses a third rail to power their trains and this causes problems for us as well. I went back to the second unit and dialed in the EOT number on that CDU and had no communication there either.

Based on the information being presented to me on my air gauges and air flow meter on the locomotive, I was not getting the air back up on the train when I reset the emergency application and began recharging the brake pipe. So JJ got to take another walk.

After he was strolling for awhile the air suddenly began to come up on the train. My indications were from the gauges though as there was still no link with the tail end. I told JJ to hold up. No point in making him walk back any further for no reason. When the air flow meter had dropped to a reasonable level, I told JJ I was going to move the train a head a little bit to see if I could reestablish a link with the telemetry. I moved the train about thirty feet or so and "beep," the CDU lit up and we had the link back. The indication was that brake pipe pressure was being restored through the entire train normally. This means the fix performed the first time we went into emergency held up. But we still had a dynamiter.

JJ worked his way back to the engines and we hit the road again.

While JJ was out checking the train, I called the Yardmaster at Markham to find out if we were going to make a pick up there this evening. He told me the Assistant Superintendent instructed him to have us highball the pick up. I asked him if he was serious. When he told me that he was I responded that we would not even contact him as we approached Markham. This is often referred to as "running silent." I also call it our "don't ask, don't tell" policy. He said this would not be a problem.

Off we went with every intention of ignoring Markham as we rolled past it. I figured that being that I had dynamic braking available to me I would be able to avoid using the air the rest of the trip. Well, like women, what they say is not always what they mean. As we approached Markham they called us.

"Don't call us, we'll call you."

Begrudgingly I answered the radio and then came the announcement that we would now stop and make a pick up; and not just a pick up, but a pick up of both some forty cars and an additional locomotive. I informed them that if this was to be the case, I wanted to seek out and correct the dynamiter. I was not going to fight a 162 car train with a dynamiter if I did not have to. And being that I had a pretty good idea of about where it was in the train, I figured it shouldn't take too long to find. Finding a dynamiter can oftentimes be akin to discovering that proverbial needle in the haystack. This is a time intensive procedure. Being that I felt we had a good starting point, I figured it would not take too long to discover it. Before JJ dropped off at Hazel Crest which is about the middle of Markham Yard and I pulled the train by him, we discussed where to begin the process. In addition to watching the train as it rolled past him for any defects, he was also going to be listening; listening for the sounds of any appreciable sized leaks. Once the tail end of the train reached him he instructed me to bring the train to a stop. He reached in and closed an angle cock, the valve on the end of each car that allows for the passage of air between cars, in between the fifth and sixth rear cars. He then requested that I set the brakes.

I made a 10 pound per square inch (psi) reduction of the brake pipe pressure and waited. We did not go into emergency. This immediately narrowed the problem down to the rear six cars. I released the brakes and he opened that closed angle cock. As he did so, the train went into emergency. When cutting in the air like this, there is a drop in brake pipe pressure. Being that I had just set and released the brakes on the cars ahead of this spot, everything from this point forward was also not fully recharged. As he cut in the air, the cars behind this spot sensed a brake pipe reduction and that pesky car reared its ugly head. So now I had to recover the emergency application once it reached my engines and then begin to recharge the entire brake pipe of the train again.

Once we had sufficient air again, JJ closed the angle cock in between the fourth and fifth rear cars and had me set the brakes again. No problem. By this time a couple of Car Inspectors had arrived to assist JJ in this endeavor. We continued this process until it was down to the very last car of the train. When I made a set of the brakes this time, POW, into emergency we went. This car was the culprit. The control valve of the car was cut out while I recovered the air and recharged the brake pipe again. We then tried a set of the brakes again and with the control valve cut out on this car, there was no UDE. Bingo!

Now being that it was the very rear car, we had to set the car out. The brakes on the head and rear car of a train must be cut in and functional. There are several reasons for this. First, if the head car is cut out, the control valve does not sense an emergency application of the brakes that may come from the Engineer. It is distinctly possible then that being the head car does not sense this type of application, it may not pass that information along to the cars behind it thus, the rest of the train may, in theory, not go into emergency but rather make a service reduction of the brakes instead.

The rear car must be functional for another reason; should it come uncoupled from the train, while the rest of the train will go into emergency, this car will not. It is then conceivable possible that this car could roll away from the train once everything comes to a stop. Being that the brakes are cut out on this car, there is nothing to stop it from rolling away if it was on any type of grade. Also, with the brakes cut out if the Engineer had to dump the air from the tail end using the EOT and CDU, again the potential is there for an emergency application to not occur as this car is cut out. Being that this cut out car is not registering an emergency application of the brakes, it may pass the reduction from the EOT on the tail end as simply a service reduction.

We found this problem with relative ease. But oftentimes when looking for the culprit car it may take hours as you have to go through much more of the train and go into emergency and then recover and recharge the brake pipe far more often during the seek and destroy process. Having to repeat these steps, especially with a big train can easily take four hours or more.

Now even though we found the problem fairly quickly, time was becoming our enemy as the sands in the hours of service glass were beginning to work against us. We wound up getting relieved at Markham. A fresh new crew was placed onto our train to finish the pick up work, set out the now bad ordered rear car and then continue on to Champaign. Our day ended with a cab ride to Champaign where would tie up at the hotel, get our rest and then come back on 331 later this day.

Even though we failed to complete the prime objective of our mission, it was still a success as nothing got wrecked, nobody got hurt and best of all, nobody got fired.

And so it goes.

Tuch